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SUCCESSOR LIABILITY: THE SUPERIORITY OF
STATUTORY REFORM TO PROTECT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMANTS
Michael D. Greent
In the last decade, products liability claimants have challenged
the limitations on a successor corporation's liability for the obliga-
tions of another corporation acquired by the successor. These chal-
lenges have shared a common denominator: each involved products
that cause injury many years after their manufacture and sale.' The
multidecade life of a punch press or the lengthy latency period of an
insidious disease,2 combined with the inevitable corporate evolution
that is the hallmark of a dynamic market economy,3 and state corpo-
rate law provisions, which deny claimants any effective remedy
against the manufacturers' shareholders, 4 have forced products lia-
bility claimants to seek redress from the corporations that acquired
the manufacturers' assets.
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.S. 1972, Tufts University; J.D. 1975,
University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Paul Neuhauser, Larry Ward, Bonnie
Brier, Ken Kress, and Mark Roe who were kind enough to read an earlier version of this
article; their comments were instrumental in improving it. I am also grateful to Jeff
Bouslog and Melissa Weets who provided invaluable research assistance.
I Scholars and lawyers are paying increased attention to the impact of the chrono-
logical dimension on the development of products liability theory. Changes in societal
attitudes toward acceptable levels of risk, concomitant reform in tort law governing the
production and sale of products having a capacity to injure, the development of new
technology, and increasing knowledge about hazards over time are all elements of the
chronological dimension. See Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983); Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Prod-
ucts Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1981).
2 See infra note 11.
3 One corporation may acquire another through a number of methods. Stock
purchases are common, but not of substantial concern here. Stock purchases only
change the predecessor's ownership; its existence, assets, and ability to meet its liabili-
ties remain unaffected. A parent corporation's liability for its subsidiary's obligations is
distinct from the successor liability questions addressed here. Unfortunately, not all
courts have recognized the distinction. In Fenton Area Pub. Schools v. Sorensen-Gross
Constr. Co., 124 Mich. App. 631, 641-44, 335 N.W.2d 221, 225-26 (1983), the court
improperly applied successor liability analysis to a parent-subsidiary relationship. In
rare instances, both successor and parent-subsidiary questions may arise out of the same
series of corporate transactions. See, e.g., Kelly v. American Precision Indus., Inc., 438
So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 447 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1984). Because
statutory mergers and consolidations are subject to well-defined statutory provisions
and therefore rarely generate controversy over liability, the transactions of primary con-
cern here are purchases of corporate assets for cash or stock.
4 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
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Court response, in the finest products liability tradition, has
been diverse. Some courts have expanded the scope of existing suc-
cessor liability doctrine.5 For example, the California and New
Jersey supreme courts pioneered new theories of successor liabil-
ity.6 I will refer to the combined efforts of the common law courts
to broaden successor liability as "liberal successor liability law."
Predictably, many jurisdictions refuse to budge from longstanding
doctrine less favorable to products liability claimants. 7
The successor liability issue arises if a product manufacturer8 is
no longer a viable juridical entity9 when a claimant brings suit for
injuries caused by the product. Typically, the manufacturer has dis-
solved and liquidated after selling its assets to another entity (the
"successor"), although a wide variety of corporate genealogies are
addressed in the numerous successor liability cases. The successor
phenomenon, largely a creature of the last decade,10 reflects in mi-
crocosm the increasing significance and impact of the products lia-
bility revolution.
All indications are that the successor liability issue will be of
5 See infra text accompanying notes 34-41.
6 See infra note 20; text accompanying notes 40-41. Several other state courts have
followed the lead of the California and New Jersey supreme courts. See Dawejko v. Jor-
gensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981); Martin v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
7 See, e.g., Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982);Jones v.Johnson
Mach. & Press Co., 211 Neb. 724, 320 N.W.2d 481 (1982). A number of courts have
also imposed a somewhat sketchy postmanufacture duty to warn on successors. See infra
notes 98, 100-01 and accompanying text.
8 Liability for injuries caused by a defective product is not limited to the manufac-
turer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). However, ultimate respon-
sibility rests with the entity responsible for the defect in the product. Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 261-63, 391 P.2d 168, 170-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-
900 (1964). Generally the manufacturer is that entity.
9 Even though the predecessor is a viable legal entity, a successor may be sued if
the predecessor is financially unsound, but one must distinguish the predecessor exper-
iencing financial difficulty from the predecessor that has distributed its assets to share-
holders. See infra text accompanying notes 108, 130-33.
10 The paucity of cases contained in an article published 11 years ago helps to
demonstrate the growth of successor liability litigation in the past decade. Annotation,
Products Liability: Liability of Successor Corporation for Injury or Damage Caused by Product Issued
by Predecessor, 66 A.L.R.3d 824 (1975). The characterization of the impact of successor
liability law contained in the annotation also provides some insight:
[In applying the common-law rule of successor liability to cases involv-
ing the liability of a corporation which acquires assets from another for
the damages or injuries caused by the transferor's product, the courts
seem generally to have narrowly construed its provisions, with the result
that the facts of only a few cases have brought such cases within the rule.
Id. at 827-28. A 1976 article in the Wall Street Journal further demonstrates the evolution
of successor law. The article analyzed the popularity of asset purchases for cash, yet
made no mention of the successor products liability implications of cash purchases.
Ricklefs, Mergers, Acquisitions Come Back into Style but the Style Is New, Wall St. J., Apr. 28,
1976, at 1, col. 6.
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increasing importance in the future. Each product manufacturer
that ceases to exist creates a potential source for successor liability
claims. Because of the longevity of certain products and the capac-
ity of other products to produce injury generations after use, ex-
isting successors will continue to face claims based on products
manufactured by their predecessors. Moreover, some evidence sug-
gests that injuries suffered by plaintiffs in successor liability cases
tend to be more serious than those suffered in all products liability
cases. 1
Many courts 12 and commentators 13 have viewed the successor
liability issue as one involving an inherent tension between the poli-
cies underlying products liability and traditional corporate law, with
its emphasis on the free alienability of property.14 However, deeper
probing reveals that the issue is both simpler and more complex
than the conventional wisdom suggests. 15
The issue is simpler because traditional corporate law has al-
ways provided substantial protection for creditors when a corpora-
tion engages in a reorganization or an asset transfer that may impair
its creditors' ability to assert and collect their claims. 16 In this re-
11 As the time from manufacture to injury increases, the amount paid also tends to
increase. An Insurance Services Office closed claim survey found that only 2.8%o of in-
jured parties make claims that involve at least a 10-year gap from manufacture to injury,
but they receive 6.6%o of the total payments. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81 (1977).
My own casual and unscientific survey of reported successor liability cases reveals
that of 54 reported decisions, 577% involved some type of industrial machinery and 20%o
involved insidious disease.
12 E.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152-54 (Ist Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
13 E.g., Aylward & Aylward, Successor Liability for Defective Products-Misplaced Responsi-
bility, 13 STETSON L. REV. 555, 557 (1984); Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability
in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142 (1980); Hyman, The Liabil-
ity of Successor Corporations for Defective Products of a Predecessor Corporation-A Switch From
Corporate to Tort Law, 10 S.U.L. REV. 165, 167 (1984).
14 See, e.g., J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 187-88, 286-89 (2d ed.
1975).
15 To the extent that there is any real conflict, it occurs at the outer fringe of prop-
erty and tort law: ownership of private property conflicts with the tort principle that one
must cede ownership of property when found liable to another. That theoretical and
highly generalized conflict hardly seems useful in evaluating the successor liability issue.
16 The devices providing protection for creditors of a corporation reorganizing or
transferring its assets include: (1) the Bulk Transfer provisions in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, U.C.C. §§ 6-101 to -111 (1977), requiring that the purchaser give notice to
the creditors of a seller engaging in a bulk transfer of its assets; (2) a common law trust
fund theory allowing claims by a dissolved corporation's creditors against the corpora-
tion's stockholders who received distributions in connection with the dissolution, e.g.,
Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944); see Schoone, Share-
holder Liability upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 417 (1961);
(3) the expanded abatement period in modem corporation statutes permitting suits
against corporations for a period of time after dissolution, see, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 105 (1979); 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
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spect, products liability claimants17 are merely long-tail creditors of
the predecessor who, because their claims accrue after the predeces-
sor's demise and perhaps because of their relatively recent arrival
on the legal landscape, have not been afforded the same protection
that traditional corporate law has provided other creditors.' 8
At the same time, the successor liability issue is more complex
because the policies underlying products liability do not compel im-
posing liability on the successor. Indeed, court analyses of succes-
sor liability reflect internal inconsistencies in the policies cited to
justify products liability, 19 the manipulation of those policies,20 and
RATIONS § 8166 (rev. perm. ed. 1979); (4) state statutes requiring notice to creditors of
intent to dissolve, see, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 87(a) (1979); (5) restrictions on
conveyances made without fair consideration that leave the corporation insolvent, see,
e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 1, 4, 10, 7A U.L.A. 430, 474, 630 (1985);
(6) statutory provisions imposing liability on the surviving corporation for the obliga-
tions of each predecessor corporation absorbed in a merger, see, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AT § 11.06(a)(3) (1984); and (7) statutes imposing liability on directors of a cor-
poration who authorize distributions to stockholders that render the corporation insol-
vent, see, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.33 (1984).
17 To clarify, only those products liability claimants who would have recovered
from the manufacturer absent the acquisition have a legitimate claim to creditor status.
18 I believe this rationale-the protection of products liability claimant-creditors,
who, because of fortuities of time, corporate organization, and their relationship with
the debtor, are unable to make adequate provision to protect themselves as most com-
mercial creditors can-is a powerful one that requires some reform of our traditional
method of handling corporate acquisitions involving the dissolution of the seller. This
principle is illustrated by the extensive efforts made to protect unknown future asbestos
victims in the bankruptcy proceedings of three asbestos manufacturers. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, 1984, at DI, col. 3 (representative appointed for future claimants in Manville
bankruptcy proceedings); N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at D3, col. 6 (proposal to create
trust fund for future claimants).
To the extent one is less sympathetic to products liability creditors than to other
creditors, reform becomes less alluring.
19 One of the most obvious anomalies in justifying products liability concerns the
question of precisely who should bear the costs of injuries associated with a product.
Some assert that the defendant is merely a conduit for passing the costs on to all con-
sumers of the product. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353, 368-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58
(1967); Keeton, Products Liability, 50 F.R.D. 338, 339 (1970). Others insist that the entity
distributing a defective product should pay the price of resulting injuries. E.g., Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965). A few courts
speak of insurance as if it affords a mechanism by which nobody ultimately suffers the
loss. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
581 (1977); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor,J., concurring in judgment). Needless to say, there is considerable
debate about where the costs of products liability claims should ultimately fall, and it is
probably a question to which no general answer exists. See L. DlALESSI & R. STAAF,
LIABILITY, CONTROL, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC AcTvrrY 24-26 (Law and Ec-
onomics Center, Univ. of Miami Working Paper No. 2, 1986).
20 Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981) provides an
interesting illustration. In the course of adopting the product line theory of successor
liability, the court suggested that imposing liability on the successor would enable the
manufacturer to spread accident costs to product users. Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822. In
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rationalizations used to reach particular results in specific cases. 2 1
This much is dear, however: simply because a products liability
claimant-indeed, any claimant-has no other viable entity from
which to obtain redress does not itself justify imposing liability on
an entity that has not contributed to the claimant's injury.22
Thoughtful resolution of the successor liability question re-
quires an inquiry that transcends the immediate, "snapshot" factual
situation presented at the time of suit. Properly viewed, an injured
claimant attempting to impose liability on a viable successor is
merely a delayed creditor of the predecessor. An analysis of the pol-
icy considerations of successor liability reveals that, contrary to the
prevailing view, only one valid reason exists for holding successors
liable: a successor can serve as a conduit to place the financial bur-
den of future products liability claims on the predecessor by dis-
counting the price the successor is willing to pay for the predecessor
by the predecessor's projected future products liability. Other ra-
tionales for successor liability collapse under close scrutiny. Thus, a
statutory solution restricting a corporation's right to dissolve and
distribute its assets to shareholders emerges as the most sensible,
direct, and efficient way to protect long-tail products liability
claimants.
Part I of this article briefly describes the common law evolution
of successor liability, a topic more extensively examined else-
where.23 Part II critically assesses the justifications offered by courts
adopting liberal successor liability law. The question of which entity
should ultimately bear the burden of the claimant's loss, an issue
that courts have often overlooked in their attempt to justify the ex-
pansion of successor liability, is essential to the analysis in this part.
Part III compares the capacity of liberal successor liability law to
perform comprehensively and efficiently the conduit function-the
sole valid rationale for holding successors liable-with the capacity
the next breath, the court suggested that the successor should discount the price paid to
a predecessor by the potential liability assumed, thereby passing future accident costs to
the predecessor. Id. at 354, 431 A.2d at 822; see also A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON TE TORT
LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS AJURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF
A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVEJUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4-85 to -87 (1984) (examining
how courts erroneously commingle terms of "risk" and "loss" in discussions of
spreading).
21 For an example of a court able to persuade itself that imposing liability on a
successor could further virtually all products liability policies, see Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,
501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974). Another court found that imposing liability on a
successor furthered none of the policy bases underlying products liability. See Domine v.
Fulton Iron Works, 76 Il. App. 3d 253, 257-58, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979).
22 That many claimants cannot collect their claims from a liable party because of its
financial inadequacy cannot justify selecting some other entity to provide substitute
compensation without some further rationale.
23 See infra note 25.
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of a dissolution-restricting statute to effect the same ends. Part IV
contains a proposal for a statute that requires a corporation, prior to
dissolution or distribution of its assets to shareholders, 24 to make
adequate provision for future products liability that may arise from
products manufactured by that corporation. Such a statute would
preserve the rights of future claimants, provide greater certainty for
corporate acquisitions and asset transfers, assure that the liability
for defective products is placed where it belongs, and still allow sub-
stantial flexibility to corporations contemplating dissolution.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERAL SUCCESSOR LIABILITY LAW
A number of traditional exceptions to the basic principle that a
successor is not liable for the obligations of a predecessor have been
articulated. 25 I will attempt to show that these supposed exceptions
are illusory; instead they are simply indirect methods of imposing
liability on the predecessor. By contrast, much of the expansion of
liberal successor liability law appears grounded in a desire either to
impose liability on successors qua successors or to expand the abil-
ity of injured claimants to obtain compensation from some entity,
regardless of its connection to the risk that caused the claimants'
harm.
The established instances in which courts impose liability on a
successor corporation include: (1) merger or consolidation of the
purchasing and selling corporation; (2) de facto merger; (3) contin-
uation; (4) contractual assumption; and (5) fraud.26
Statutes imposing liability on the surviving entity of a merger or
consolidation of two corporations 27 rest on the theory that the survi-
24 See infra Proposed Statute § 1(b); note 160.
25 Substantial commentary has addressed and discussed the traditional exceptions
to successor liability in the context of products liability claimants. See Juenger & Schul-
man, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39 (1975); Nielsen, Liability of
Successor Corporations, 32 FED'N INS. CoUNs. Q. 63 (1981); Wallach, Products Liability: A
Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on
Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321 (1976); Note, Assumption of Products Liabil-
ity in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Assumption of Lia-
bility]; Note, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 525 (1981); Note, Expanding the Products Liability of
Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1305 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Expanding Liabil-
ity]; Comment, Successor Liability in Corporate Acquisitions-An Examination of Attempts to Limit
the Use of the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 46J. AnR L. & COM. 483, 483-89, 492-510 (1981)
[hereinafter Comment, De Facto Merger]; Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Suc-
cessor Corporations, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 595 (1978); Recent Development, 44 TENN. L. REV.
905 (1977); Annotation, supra note 10.
26 See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Knapp v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-65 & 364 n.8 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975).
27 See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 11.06(a)(3) (1984).
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vor represents an amalgamation of the predecessor or predecessors.
Thus, imposing liability on the survivor is tantamount to imposing it
on the entities that joined together to make up the successor. Lia-
bility is not imposed on an entity distinct from the predecessor, but
on an entity which has absorbed the predecessor.
The de facto merger exception developed to encompass sales
of assets for stock that were functionally equivalent to a merger.
Although originally designed to enhance the rights of dissenting
shareholders, 28 the predecessor's creditors subsequently used it to
impose liability on the successor. 29 Courts have limited the de facto
merger exception to acquisitions in which the predecessor's assets
were acquired in exchange for stock,30 reasoning that because the
predecessor's stockholders own part of the successor, those share-
holders assume the burden for the predecessor's liabilities. 31
Until recently, courts narrowly construed the continuation ex-
ception, imposing liability on an entity that differed only formally
from its predecessor.32 A successor whose ownership, management,
and corporate operations are the same as its predecessor is not a
separate economic entity simply because of formalistic changes.
Thus, the economic unit that incurred the liability remains responsi-
ble for it.
Similarly, a successor may contractually assume the predeces-
sor's liability. The successor has agreed, through market exchange,
to assume a liability of the predecessor, presumably in exchange for
consideration sufficient to make the assumption attractive. The con-
cessions or reduction in price made by the predecessor means that
28 See, e.g., Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d
146 (Ch. Div.) (corporate combination deemed de facto merger and declared invalid if
notice to shareholders insufficient), aff'd, 33 NJ. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (reorganization agreement deemed
merger in which shareholders had right to dissent).
29 See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975).
30 E.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977); Shannon v. Sam-
uel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
31 This theory is flawed. The acquiring corporation's shareholders also bear a por-
tion of the selling entity's products claims. If the ratio of stock paid for the purchase to
total outstanding stock is very low, acquiring shareholders may bear the lion's share of
this liability. The successor can, of course, discount its purchase offer to reflect this
liability, but that opportunity exists regardless of the method of acquisition. Recogni-
tion of this flaw by the Michigan Supreme Court contributed to its decision to expand
the de facto merger doctrine to include purchases of assets for cash. Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 422-23, 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (1976).
32 See, e.g., Lopata v. Bemis Co., 406 F. Supp. 521, 526-27 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (refusing
to apply exception where so-called predecessor retained independent existence despite
sale of bulk of assets to defendant), aft'd, 546 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Comment,
De Facto Merger, supra note 25, at 498 (discussing court treatment of continuity
exception).
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it, not the successor, bears the estimated future costs that were
assumed.
Finally, although one might view the fraud or inadequate con-
sideration exception as a means of retribution, it is also consistent
with a theory of imposing the predecessor's liabilities on the succes-
sor to offset the economic advantage obtained by the successor in
paying less than full value for the predecessor's assets. The low
purchase price received by the predecessor represents payment for
liabilities transferred to the successor. 33
Liberal successor liability law has substantially expanded the
scope of these five limited justifications for successor liability and
has even fashioned an additional theory. Although not yet widely
embraced, the trend is clear and quite sensible. Assuming that
products liability claimants have an otherwise valid claim, those
claimants are creditors whose claims should not be extinguished by
some form of corporation reorganization. Indeed, in one respect
products liability claimants have an even stronger claim for legal
protection. Unlike contract creditors, who voluntarily choose to be-
come creditors and have the opportunity to bargain for protection
for their claims, products liability creditors do not voluntarily as-
sume their status and do not have the opportunity to obtain conces-
sions from their debtors providing greater security for their
claims.34
The principal expansion of traditional successor liability doc-
trine has taken place in the de facto merger and continuation ar-
eas.35  Courts have eliminated the requirements that the
33 Neither the fraud nor the inadequate consideration theory has played any signifi-
cant role in successor products liability. One commentator noted in 1979 that as of that
date no claimant had attempted to utilize § 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances
Act. Note, Products Liability: Developments in the Rule of Successor Liability for Product-Related
Injuries, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 338, 354 n.79 (1979). That statement is still true as of
1985, at least with regard to reported decisions. Nor have I uncovered any case in which
a products claimant has asserted fraud against a successor. The reason for this, I sus-
pect, is the difficulty of reconstructing, many years after the fact, the value of assets at
their time of transfer from a now-defunct corporation.
34 See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 499,
506 (1976).
The market-oriented skeptic might respond that purchasers of products have the
opportunity to take into account the likelihood of some future reorganization by the
product manufacturer in making a decision whether to purchase. The flawed assump-
tions in the skeptic's response, not to mention that many long-tail products liability
claimants are bystanders, are sufficiently evident that further elaboration seems
unnecessary.
35 There is substantial overlap between the de facto merger and the expanded con-
tinuation theories. See Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58
IND. L.J. 677, 699-700 (1983).
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predecessor cease to exist immediately after the acquisition3 6 and
that the consideration paid to the predecessor consist only of
stock.37 Rather than focusing on whether a successor is in all func-
tional aspects a continuation of the predecessor, courts have fash-
ioned an amorphous "totality of the circumstances" test.38 Under
this test, for example, a change in ownership does not necessarily
prevent a finding of continuation. 39
An equally significant element of liberal successor liability law is
the creation of a new theory of successor liability. In Ray v. Alad
Corp.,40 the California Supreme Court fashioned a product line the-
ory to impose liability on a successor. After considering such factors
as the successor's acquisition of all the assets necessary to continue
the predecessor's manufacturing operations, the successor's contin-
uation of the predecessor's manufacturing enterprise, the plaintiff's
inability to assert a claim against the predecessor because of the
predecessor's sale and subsequent dissolution, and the successor's
ability to spread products liability losses to users, the court imposed
liability on the successor to the same extent that the predecessor
would have been liable for losses from its defective products.41
36 See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975).
37 See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 422-23, 244 N.W.2d 873,
880 (1976). Recent literature discussing the liberalization of successor liability law in-
cludes: Aylward & Aylward, supra note 13; Fegan, supra note 13; Kadens, Practitioner's
Guide to Treatment of Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 1
(1978); D. Phillips, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Commercial Law
Perspective, 11 HoFsTRA L. REV. 249 (1982);J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor
Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (1983); Note, Imposing Strict Liability upon a
Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of Its Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to
the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1397 (1982); Note, Continued Expansion of
Corporate Successor Liability in the Products Liability Arena, 58 CHI.[-]KErr L. REV. 1117
(1982); Note, supra note 35; Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and
Successor Corporations, 43 OHIo ST. LJ. 441 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Restoration of
Certainty]; Note, Products Liability: Successor Corporations: Liability for Defective Products, 35
OIrA. L. REV. 846 (1982); Comment, A Search for the Outer Limits to Successor Corporation
Liability for Defective Products of Predecessors, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 117 (1982) [hereinafter
Comment, Search for Outer Limits]; Casenote, Successor Liability in Washington: When a Succes-
sor Should Be Liable for a Predecessor's Products Liability-Meisel v. M & N Modem Hydraulic
Press Company, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 323 (1983).
38 See, e.g., Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(continuation found where seller remained in existence but trained and assisted buyer's
employees, anticipated buyer's use of seller's name, agreed not to compete against
buyer, and agreed to forward business inquiries to buyer); Turner v. Bituminous Casu-
alty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (listing guidelines for determining
continuation).
39 E.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
40 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). The product line theory
adopted by the California Supreme Court was first proposed in Note, Expanding Liability,
supra note 25, at 1325.
41 A qualification is necessary. The Ray court, along with most other courts that
have subscribed to liberal successor liability law, only addressed the successor's liability
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The increasing entrenchment, albeit with fits and starts, of lib-
eral successor liability law continues. More and more plaintiffs are
attempting to convert courts and, once converted, to induce them to
expand the outer reaches of the doctrine. At the same time, corpo-
rate acquisition specialists have taken note of this trend and have
modified the structure of corporation acquisitions so as to minimize
the likelihood of incurring successor liability.42 Through all the ma-
neuvering and legal debate, two important questions remain ob-
scured: (1) on whom are we attempting to impose this liability?; and
(2) is liberal successor liability law the appropriate method by which
to do it? Analyzing and answering these two questions will provide
insight into the underlying goals of successor liability law and fur-
nish guidelines for the most effective means of achieving those
policies.
II
LEGITIMATING LIBERAL SUCCESSOR LIABILITY LAW: WHOSE
LIABILITY IS IT ANYWAY?
A. Introduction
Courts that have used their common law prerogative to adopt
liberal successor liability law have never coherently answered the
question of who, ultimately, should bear the costs that are not left
with those who suffer product-related injuries. 43 Justifying the ex-
for compensatory damages. But see, e.g., Krull v. Celotex Corp., 611 F. Supp. 146 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (holding successor liable for punitive damages because it merged with prede-
cessor); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376, 379 (N.D. Iowa 1984)
(holding successor liable for punitive damages because it merged with predecessor and
expressly agreed to assume all liabilities). The concerns relevant to punitive damages,
which if truly punitive constitute a windfall to the plaintiff, are sufficiently different from
those of compensatory damages that this article is limited to consideration of successor
liability for compensatory damages. For a discussion of successor liability for punitive
damages, see Comment, Killing the Son for the Sins of the Father: The Impropriety of Punitive
Damages Against a Successor Corporation, 1986 ARiz. ST. LJ. 101; Note, A Proposal for the
Proper Use of Punitive Damages Against a Successor, 11 J. CORP. L. 765 (1986).
42 See Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw.
489 (1979); Winthrop, Structuring a Corporate Acquisition to Avoid the De Factor Merger Doc-
trine, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1978); Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and Scope
of Successor Corporation Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 185
(1984).
43 A definitive answer to this question is well beyond the scope of this article. Nev-
ertheless, some explication of the range of issues that this question presents will assist
the analysis of legitimate rationales for liberal successor liability law.
A number of initial loss-bearing candidates exist, each of which then raises addi-
tional possibilities and increasingly more difficult questions. Sellers of defective prod-
ucts have been touted as the appropriate entity to bear related losses. But modern
methods of distribution often involve several sellers. Spreading the loss to all consum-
ers of the product involved is often suggested. But the loss cannot be placed on each of
these entities at the same time. And even after selecting one, further questions exist. If
notions of deterrence (and perhaps retribution) take primacy, then the seller responsible
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tension of liability to successors raises questions about whether the
predecessor or the successor more desirably bears the loss.
An initial assessment of the appropriate loss bearer in the suc-
cessor context points toward imposing liability on the entity respon-
sible for the defective product that caused the injury-the
predecessor. In the absence of the predecessor, the next analytical
step might lead to a conclusion that the successor serves as a sec-
ond-best cost bearer, particularly if some ground justifying imposi-
tion of liability on the successor can be identified. A number of
courts have reasoned in this fashion 44 and provided a variety of ra-
tionales-ranging from the successor's role in compromising the
continuing existence of the predecessor to pure notions of compen-
sation-to justify imposing liability on the successor. Other courts
have transcended this second-best reasoning and suggested that the
successor is an equal or preferred loss bearer to the predecessor.45
Before a sensible analysis of liberal successor liability law can be
attempted, the justifications for imposing liability on the successor
must be examined. Only after identifying the legitimate justifica-
for the defect is the obvious loss-bearing candidate-but do we want the stockholders of
the company, who likely had no involvement in the manufacture or sale of a defective
product, the management of the company, or perhaps the employees of the company
(some of whom may be the true culprits) to bear the loss? If spreading the loss is the
answer, do we want to spread as widely as possible to reduce the secondary accident
costs that Dean Calabresi, among others, has discussed? G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS 27-28, 39-45 (1970). Or is the purpose to impose a tax on each user of the
product equal to her proportionate share of the total personal injury costs involved,
thereby effectuating "market deterrence," through a decreased demand for and con-
sumption of the injury-causing product? See id. at 68-75.
44 See, e.g., Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Colo.
1984) (holding successor manufacturer liable when predecessor had been liquidated).
45 See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
581 (1977) (asserting that successor is in better position to distribute losses than prede-
cessor); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976)
(dissolution of predecessor only one factor in determining whether de facto merger took
place); Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982) (both
predecessor and successor can be held liable for plaintiff's injuries); see also J. Phillips,
supra note 37, at 915-17 (asserting that predecessor and successor arejoint tort-feasors);
Comment, Restoration of Certainty, supra note 37 (endorsing presumption of successor lia-
bility; nonexistence of predecessor only one factor relevant to rebut presumption); Re-
cent Development, Products Liability-Liability of Transferee for Defective Products
Manufactured by Transferor, 30 VAND. L. REv. 238, 257 (1977) (successor should be liable
only on continuity of product line theory because of "the paramount strict liability policy
of spreading the risk of loss to all the consumers of the product line so that the product
will bear the social and individual costs of its own defects").
These proposals are most commonly made in conjunction with advocating the
adoption of the product line theory. As one student commentator explained, "Under
the product line approach, the successor assumes the predecessor's liability, not because
it represents a continuation of that corporation, but because it is a continuation of the
manufacturing operation." NewJersey Development, The Product Line Theory of Corporate
Successor Products Liability: An Evaluation After Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 413 (1983).
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tions for liberal successor liability and assessing their implications to
determine the appropriate loss bearer can the ultimate question-
how to impose the losses most efficiently-be confronted.
B. Analyzing the Rationales Proffered in Support of Liberal
Successor Liability Law
Courts that adopt and commentators that advocate liberal suc-
cessor liability law have tendered a variety of justifications that can
be separated into eight individual rationales. These rationales are:
(1) despite a change in ownership, courts should treat the successor
as if it were the predecessor because no change apparent to custom-
ers has taken place; (2) the successor that obtains the predecessor's
goodwill and benefits from it should also assume the predecessor's
liabilities; (3) the successor is best able to provide compensation,
spread the risk, and obtain insurance; (4) from the perspective of
the injured claimant, the details of a corporate acquisition are irrele-
vant and therefore should not operate to prevent successor liability;
(5) by purchasing the predecessor's assets, the successor contributes
to the destruction of the plaintiff's remedies; (6) after acquiring the
predecessor's business, the successor can gauge the risks of the
products involved; (7) accident losses can best be minimized by im-
posing liability on the successor, thereby deterring manufacture of
dangerous products and encouraging postsale safety measures; and
(8) the successor can act as a conduit to channel losses back to the
predecessor by discounting the purchase price in accordance with
the predecessor's projected products liability.
I examine each of these rationales below.
1. The "Holding Out" Doctrine
It is well-settled in the law of agency that one who holds an-
other out as his agent is liable for obligations created by the agent.46
According to courts that have adapted this doctrine to successor lia-
bility law, when the successor corporation represents itself as "a
continuation of the original manufacturing enterprise, a strong indi-
cation of continuity is established. Justice would be offended if a
corporation which holds itself out as a particular company for the
purpose of sales, would not be estopped from denying that it is that
company for the purpose of determining products liability." 47
46 See G. REINHARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 90 (1902); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 31 (1958); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965)
(entity that holds itself out as manufacturer of product is liable as if it were
manufacturer).
47 Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 426, 244 N.W.2d 873, 882
(1976); see also Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.S.C.
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Despite the superficial appeal of this analogy, it contains a sub-
stantial flaw. Essential to the holding out theory is the reliance of a
third party on representations made by the principal. This reliance
forms the causal link between the holding out and the third party's
claim. In the products liability context, however, third parties do
not rely on representations made by the successor. By definition,
the predecessor, not the successor, manufactured and then sold the
product that injured the victim. 48 Thus, the attempted analogy fails
because of the absence of reliance. The holding out theory provides
no support for liberal successor liability.49
2. Acquiring Goodwill: Bearing the Burden Along with the Benefit
Related to the holding out theory is the more popular rationale
that a successor that profits from the predecessor's goodwill must
also bear the burden of the predecessor's liabilities.50 According to
this theory, the successor must assume the obligation for the prede-
cessor's products liability claims if it desires to reap the benefits of
the predecessor's goodwill.
This reasoning is specious. Goodwill 5' is simply an intangible
property right. The successor has, by hypothesis, paid adequate
compensation to obtain the goodwill and has put it to productive
use. Unless the courts relying on this argument are creating a new
concept of property rights,52 no justification exists for requiring a
purchaser to pay more for an asset than the parties have agreed it is
worth.53 Despite substantial criticism, 54 courts blithely continue to
1977) (successor operating under virtually identical name cannot deny liability); An-
drews v.John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 785-86 (Ala. 1979) (successor hold-
ing itself out as predecessor estopped from denying liability).
48 SeeJ. Phillips, supra note 37, at 919-20.
49 See Note, supra note 35, at 704; Note, supra note 33, at 376.
50 See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1983); see
also Comment, Search for Outer Limits, supra note 37, at 131.
51 The term "goodwill" represents the difference between the value of a firm as a
going concern and the value of its assets if they were liquidated. See, e.g., J. GUARDINO,
ACCOUNTING, LEGAL AND TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE ACQUISMONs 50-52 (1973).
52 Even if they were, why liabilities created at the time of the manufacture and sale
of the defective product should attach to goodwill at some future time is less than clear.
53 A distinct justification, sometimes asserted in conjunction with the goodwill ar-
gument, is that the successor can discount the price paid for the predecessor to take
account of future products claims. It is important to recognize that these are two very
different arguments. The first relies on a notion that the successor, as owner of the
predecessor's goodwill, must pay for defective products losses. The latter simply relies
on the successor to play the role of a conduit, passing on the costs of future claims to the
predecessor. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
54 See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978)
(purchase of goodwill by successor does not justify imposing liability on successor); Tift
v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 99, 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (1982) (Callow, J.,
dissenting) (imposing liability based on goodwill forces successor to pay for goodwill at
time of acquisition and again as products claims arise); Aylward & Aylward, supra note
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rely on the goodwill justification to support liberal successor liability
law.
3. Compensating, Loss Spreading, and Insurance
Three related rationales that courts frequently invoke to justify
liberal successor liability law are the ability of the successor to:
(1) provide compensation to 'an otherwise remediless claimant; 55
(2) spread the burden of product injuries;56 and (3) obtain insur-
ance. 57 These arguments do not justify imposing liability on the
successor.
Although compensation is an important goal in the develop-
ment of modern products liability, this rationale provides no reason
for selecting the successor to provide it, rather than another indus-
try manufacturer, the United States government or, to pick a ran-
dom wealthy entity, IBM. 58  Single-minded pursuit of the
compensation goal always leads one toward finding liability59 with-
out providing any coherent rationale as to the entity from whom the
compensation should come.60
13, at 580-81; Kadens, supra note 37, at 18; D. Phillips, supra note 37, at 254-55; Schul-
man, Commentary: Successor Corporation Liability and the Inadequacy of the Product Line Con-
tinuity Approach, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 136 (1984).
55 In some instances the claimant possesses a remedy despite the predecessor's
nonexistence. Other potential defendants, such as a retailer, may exist. See, e.g., Strat-
ton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 254, 676 P.2d 1290 (1984). Imposing liability on
the other entity, as against the successor, would appear preferable. However, when the
liability is imposed on the successor as conduit to the predecessor, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 105-06, then preferring the successor makes sense. See Ray v. Alad Corp.,
19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977) (recognizing that
retailer has indemnification claim against predecessor).
56 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 350-52, 431 A.2d 811, 820-
22 (1981).
57 See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974)
(noting importance of insurance in performing loss-spreading function), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975).
58 D. Phillips, supra note 37, at 254. See generally Y. AHARONI, THE No-RSK SOCIETY
76-98 (1981) (detailing growth of government insurance programs).
59 See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,
703-07 (1980).
60 The theory that the successor's continuation of the product line enables it to
distribute losses to consumers of the product purports to address the "where" question
in a way that the unadorned compensation rationale does not. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 88-97.
The tort system has always addressed where the compensatibn should come from
through causal requirements, which permit effectuation of other goals such as deter-
rence, nondiffuse risk spreading, and distributive justice. See Aylward & Aylward, supra
note 13. Professor Phillips has also made the point, quite persuasively, that the spread-
ing rationale is an inadequate justification for liberal successor liability doctrine. D. Phil-
lips, supra note 37, at 251-52; see also Note, supra note 35, at 695-96. I disagree with
Professor Phillips, however, on the legitimate rationales for expanding successor liabil-
ity. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
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Similarly, a rationale based on loss spreading purely for its own
sake6' provides no basis for imposing successor liability. A univer-
sal, publicly funded compensation system would far better achieve
maximum spreading.62 There is simply no coherent basis for select-
ing successors as preferred risk spreaders.
Finally, the successors' ability to obtain insurance for liability
imposed on them for injuries caused by products manufactured and
sold by their predecessors is offered by courts as a justification for
liberal successor liability law.63 Indeed, some courts have embraced
the insurance rationale as though it enables successors to avoid lia-
bility simply by purchasing insurance.64
These courts fail to recognize that premiums paid to purchase
an insurance policy, if properly underwritten and rated, reflect the
entire cost of liability imposed on successors through liberal succes-
sor liability law. 65 Although insurance may spread out the costs
across a number of manufacturers with small exposures, it does not
eliminate or even reduce the overall burden. Indeed, the overhead
costs and conservative underwriting practices of many liability insur-
ers and the uncertain path of future legal doctrine have led (or
forced) many manufacturers to employ self-insurance to deal with
products liability risks.66
In sum, although compensation, loss spreading, and insurance
are important underlying goals of modem products liability law,
they do not provide any reasoned basis for imposing liability on
successors.
4. The Plaintiff's Perspective
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,67 the Michigan Supreme
61 Here, I distinguish pure spreading rationales from more instrumental spreading,
which is intended to effectuate market deterrence or some similar, independent goal.
With regard to market deterrence, see infra text accompanying notes 88-97.
62 New Zealand has adopted this approach. See Palmer, Compensation for Personal In-
jury: A Requiem for the Common Law in New Zealand, 21 AM.J. COMP. L. 1 (1973).
63 Indeed, my own suspicion is that some of the courts that have most avidly em-
braced liberal successor liability have been influenced by the fact that the successor was
represented by an attorney hired by an insurer that had written a products liability policy
on the risk.
64 See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
581 (1977); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring in judgment).
65 See M. GREENE, RISK AND INSURANCE 640"49 (3d ed. 1973); INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT 1-23 to -24 (1978) (under direction of U.S.
Department of Commerce).
For a cogent argument that liability insurance has played a significant role in ex-
panding tort liability, see E. BERNZWEIG, By ACCIDENT NOT DESIGN 104-11 (1980).
66 G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS 132-37 (1983).
67 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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Court observed that a plaintiff, unable to recover from a predeces-
sor, is indifferent to the precise form of corporation acquisition used
by the successor to acquire the predecessor. Accordingly, the court
relied on this ground in holding that a successor who purchased as-
sets for cash, rather than stock, could still be held liable on an ex-
panded de facto merger theory. 68
The Turner rationale, related to the compensation rationale and
sharing its common weakness, provides no basis for selecting the
successor as the provider of the plaintiff's compensation. The
plaintiff is not only indifferent as to the details by which the succes-
sor acquired the predecessor's assets, but is also unconcerned about
which entity serves as a compensation surrogate for the predeces-
sor. The plaintiff's perspective rationale contains no logical stop-
ping point; this rationale would presumably hold liable an entity
that purchased only the tangible assets of a predecessor undergoing
bankruptcy. 69 Ultimately, the plaintiff's perspective provides no
more justification for imposing successor liability than does an
unadorned appeal for compensation.70
5. The Successor's Actions Contributing to the Destruction of
Plaintiff's Remedies
A fifth and more popular rationale for liberal successor liability
law is that the successor's acquisition of the predecessor's assets
contributed to the plaintiff's inability to recover from the predeces-
sor. Professor David Phillips has characterized this as the succes-
sor's role in increasing the recourse risk to the injured claimant,
arguing that this justifies imposing liability on the successor. 71
This rationale does have the advantage of recognizing that the
successor's liability is secondary to that of the predecessor. More-
over, it strikes closer to the core of the successor liability problem:
the dissolution and liquidation of the predecessor. This rationale
also focuses on those actions of the successor having a nexus to the
plaintiff's predicament. Ultimately, however, this rationale is un-
persuasive and inadequate.
Before detailing the weaknesses of this justification, a pause to
clarify a misconception is necessary. An asset purchase does not di-
68 Id. at 429-30, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 116-20; cf. Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d
1217 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to impose liability on successor of predecessor that was in
reorganization under chapter 11). But cf. Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., 220
Neb. 175, 368 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (permitting successor that purchased assets of insol-
vent corporation to be held liable as continuation of predecessor).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
71 See D. Phillips, supra note 37.
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minish or destroy the plaintiff's remedies against the predecessor,72
despite intimations otherwise by a number of courts.73 Rather, an
asset purchase provides the predecessor with a readily transferable
asset (cash or stock) for distribution to its stockholders and thereby
facilitates its ability to wind up its affairs, dissolve, and liquidate.
The first difficulty with the destruction of the remedy rationale
is the implicit amorphous predicate that the successor, by engaging
in an asset acquisition, has committed a wrong that justifies impos-
ing liability.74 This assumption becomes troublesome when one
recognizes that a successor is merely engaged in that most cherished
of free market ideals-purchasing assets that it believes it can put to
more productive uses. 75 The weakness in this rationale is further
illustrated by several hypotheticals. Would a supplier that entered
into what ultimately proved to be a very favorable long-term supply
contract that threatened the purchaser's financial viability be liable
to the purchaser's creditors because the supplier contributed to the
destruction of the creditors' remedies? Similarly, would entities that
contributed to a debtor's inability to meet its obligations-a success-
ful personal injury claimant or the author of a scathing review about
a new Broadway production-be held liable to disappointed
creditors?76
Finally, if we wish to focus on the forces that led to the plain-
tiff's inability to recover from the predecessor, we should examine
the state dissolution and liquidation statutes that permit a corpora-
tion to avoid its obligations to future creditors. Statutes that allow a
corporation to distribute the cash or stock received from an asset
sale without making any provision for future claimants play a far
more significant role than successors in compromising a products
liability plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation. As I shall explain
later, the appropriate solution lies in modifying those statutes to
72 See Schulman, supra note 54, at 145 n.30 (pointing out seller is in "as strong a
position to meet [future] claims as in the presale period").
73 See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31, 560 P.2d 3, 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 580
(1977) (relying in part on "virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business" to impose
liability on successor); Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing Ray because there "sale had the effect of eliminating an avenue of recov-
ery which the plaintiff would otherwise have had").
74 SeeJ. Phillips, supra note 37, at 916-17.
75 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 1.1, at 9 (3d ed. 1986).
76 Admittedly, I have chosen examples in which the entity's actions compromise the
debtor's financial capacity, rather than merely facilitate a viable debtor's ability to shield
assets from creditors, as is more commonly the case in the successor liability context.
This emphasizes, rather than detracts from, the point: the "contributed to the destruc-
tion" rationale relies on the predecessor's absence and the successor's role in that ab-
sence, not on a "passing through" or "conduit" role for the successor. See infra text
accompanying note 105.
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protect future products liability claimants. 77
6. The Successor's Ability to Gauge Products' Risks
The rationale that "the successor possesses the ability to gauge
the risk of injury which could result from previously manufactured
products"78 has not played a significant role in the development of
liberal successor liability law. Nevertheless, unlike several previ-
ously surveyed rationales, it explains why the successor, as opposed
to any other wealthy entity, should bear responsibility for injuries
caused by the predecessor's products. This rationale, however,
does little to advance the cause of liberal successor liability because
of weaknesses both in its empirical generalization and in the norma-
tive standard it necessarily, albeit implicitly, adopts.
First, the empirical assumption that successors have adequate
information to make an informed assessment of the predecessor's
potential products liability is probably unjustified at least in succes-
sor liability cases involving insidious disease, which comprise a sig-
nificant class of successor liability cases. Many acquisitions took
place before the risks of a particular product were fully appreciated,
at a time when neither the successor nor the predecessor had the
capacity to make informed judgments about potential liability. 79
Even in the durable goods area, many corporate acquisitions tran-
spired decades ago amid a legal landscape in which products liability
was not a significant force.8 0 Thus, even if factual information about
risks was available at the time of the acquisition, the legal environ-
ment did not provide incentives to obtain or analyze the data.
The normative judgment that the successor's access to informa-
tion about risks justifies holding the successor liable for injuries that
ultimately occur is even more troubling than the empirical assump-
tions made by this rationale.8 ' Tort law generally rejects the notion
77 See infra notes 143-67 and accompanying text.
78 Comment, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break from Tradition, 49 U.
COLO. L. REV. 357, 373 (1978) (describing basis for decision in Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d
22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977)).
79 See, e.g., Kline v.Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1984) (acquisition
of asbestos product line in 1962); Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir.
1980) (acquisition in 1950s and 1960s of manufacturing division that produced X-ray
contrast dye later alleged carcinogenic); cf. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estop-
pel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REV. 14 1,
192-94 (1984) (describing controversy over when risks of asbestos were known).
80 See, e.g., Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 219 (Iowa 1980) (industrial
machine manufactured at turn of century involved in accident in 1975); see generally Hen-
derson, supra note 1; Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796 (1983).
81 This rationale overlaps with one aspect of the deterrence rationale: imposing
liability on the party with the best information about the risks creates an incentive to
eliminate those risks whose future costs are greater than the retrospective precaution
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that parties are liable for an injury simply because of information
they possess about the risks that led to the loss. Certainly foresee-
ability plays a central role8 2 in establishing the existence of a duty,
but the liable party's participation in creating or enhancing the risk
has always been an important element.8 3 That participation is ab-
sent in the case of a successor.
7. Deterrence
To address comprehensively the various elements of deterrence
that courts and commentators have raised in the successor liability
context, I will first define deterrence broadly and then examine
three distinct areas in which liberal successor liability may play a
role. First, deterrence encompasses all cost-justified methods of re-
ducing the incidence of accidents. Products liability laws can serve
to deter inefficient behavior by: (1) encouraging the addition of
cost-justified safety measures to a product at the time of manufac-
ture; (2) reducing the incidence of a product's use, and thereby re-
lated injuries, by passing the costs of product-related injuries on to
consumers in the form of higher prices; or (3) providing incentives
for postsale, cost-justified remedial safety measures. Each of these
aspects of potential deterrence deserves separate consideration.
a. Encouraging Cost-Justified Safety Measures. Providing financial
incentives for a manufacturer to incorporate safety measures in the
design and manufacture of its products, despite intractable valua-
tion problems,8 4 has served as a cornerstone of the products liability
reformation. However, imposing liability on an entity that by defini-
tion did not contribute to a product's design or manufacture quite
obviously cannot further this deterrence function.8 5 Indeed, impos-
costs. This may have been part of the court's reasoning in Ramirez v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811,822 (1981) (successor has information necessary to
insure against risks and to avoid costs of injuries). I deal separately with this aspect of
the deterrence rationale. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
82 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d
334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976) (foreseeability most important consideration in
establishing therapist's duty to warn of danger posed by patient).
83 See generally W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 56, at 373-77 (5th
ed. 1984) (highlighting act/omission distinction by examining duty to aid one in peril).
Otherwise, this "knowledge" rationale could provide the basis for finding liable a gov-
ernmental agency that gathers information about accidental injuries or a trade organiza-
tion that promulgates safety standards based on data provided by members. See also
Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 292-94 (Tex. Ct. App.) (rejecting
product line successor liability as inconsistent with general tort principles which require
that defendant contribute to injury), writ of error refused, 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985).
84 See, e.g., Green, supra note 79, at 216-17 & 217 n.424; see also Graham & Vaupel,
Value of a Life: What Difference Does It Make?, 1 RISK ANALYsIs 89, 93-94 (1981) (finding
enormous variation in governmental agency valuations of human life).
85 See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1982) (imposing liabil-
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ing liability on the successor, not only for its product injuries but
also for its predecessor's, should result in, as the economists de-
scribe it, safety overincentive. 86
If products liability law is to allocate accident costs properly,
the entity that had the opportunity to take safety measures-the
predecessor-should bear the costs of product-related injuries. To
be effective, successor liability law must influence corporate deci-
sions at the time of product design and manufacture. Although gen-
eralizations about the response of manufacturers to products
liability law are perilous,8 7 it seems unlikely that many corporations
will reduce their investment in safety because they believe that a fu-
ture corporate transfer will enable them ultimately to externalize
products liability costs.
b. Market Deterrence. The second aspect of deterrence, bor-
rowed from welfare economists and popularized in the legal com-
munity by Dean Calabresi, 88 reduces accidents by making products
reflect the costs of injuries associated with their use.89 Among other
ity on successor who "was never in a position to eliminate the risk" is not consistent with
goals of strict liability); Note, supra note 35, at 691-98.
86 Such a successor would bear both the losses associated with the products it man-
ufactured and those involving the predecessor's products. The only additional effective
precautions the successor can take to avoid the predecessor's liability is to cease manu-
facturing the product line, or, when cost justified, to engage in remedial measures, see
infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. The manufacturer cannot diminish its suc-
cessor liability by increasing the safety of the products it manufactures.
An advocate of the product line theory of liberal successor liability law might con-
tend that successor liability provides successors with important safety information in the
form of suits filed against them. Given the long time lag between design decisions and
products liability suits, as well as the weak role that specific products liability suits play in
influencing the design process, this argument is unpersuasive. See G. EADS & P. REUTER,
supra note 66, at 106-09.
87 An increasing effort has been devoted to the study of corporate responses, both
short- and long-term, to the development of increased responsibility for product de-
fects. That response remains quite diffuse. See generally id. For a more theoretical assess-
ment of the implications of a divergence of interest between a corporation and its
management, see Henderson, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of
Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1983).
88 See G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 70-73.
89 The articulation of the market deterrence goal is rarely as explicit as I have stated
in the text. Most often it is articulated as a more undifferentiated risk-spreading ap-
proach that the courts implicitly limit to the product involved. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Am-
sted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811, 822 (1981) (successor "was in the
same position as its predecessors ... to spread the risk of accident injuries to users of
defective ... power presses").
This version of risk spreading seems inherent in the enterprise notions that form
the core of the product line theory. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3,
10, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977); Ramirez, 86 NJ. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822; NewJersey
Development, supra note 45, at 417 (examining New Jersey case law); Recent Develop-
ment, supra note 45, at 253 (examining Ray).
The market deterrence theory fails to explain successor liability that is premised on
continuity of ownership, such as a de facto merger. If the costs of successor liability are
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inadequacies, use of market deterrence to justify liberal successor
liability law suffers from underbreadth. The theory does not justify
imposing liability on a successor who eliminates the dangerous as-
pects of the product involved, or a successor who discontinues a
product line and is therefore unable to pass accident and safety
costs on to consumers of the product.90 The market deterrence the-
ory also compels the conclusion that a successor continuing the
product line should be liable even if the predecessor is still in exist-
ence and conducting different operations; only the successor is in a
position to pass costs along to the consumers of the product. In-
deed, if carried one more logical step, market deterrence would shift
products liability to a corporation that purchased only one of several
product lines from a seller.9 1
A theoretical clarification is required to demonstrate further
difficulties with the market deterrence theory as a justification for
liberal successor liability law. In a perfect products liability system
that only imposes liability in a post-hoc manner, based on findings
of defectiveness, financial incentives induce manufacturers to em-
ploy all cost-justified safety precautions. In such a system, courts do
not impose liability on manufacturers for injuries that such meas-
ures could not prevent.92 Thus, no products liability judgments
should exist for manufacturers to pass to previous purchasers of a
product. The Calabresian scheme, one should recall, involved an ex
ante evaluation of the cheapest cost avoider and then imposed all
product-related losses on the chosen entity.93
Obviously, the market deterrence model is far too simplistic
given the distortions and imperfections of the real world.94 Market
simply being passed on to consumers, there is little need to examine who is acting as the
conduit.
90 Cf. Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982) (successor discontinued
particular model of lawn mower that injured plaintiff). But see Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver,
Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979) (imposing liability on successor for
injury inflicted by machine custom-built by predecessor).
91 Cf. Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (sec-
ond successor, which purchased product line from first successor, could be held liable
despite continuing existence of first successor). The logic of this theory would allow
Johns-Manville to avoid future asbestos claims because it no longer manufactures asbes-
tos products. Johns-Manville's attempt to do just that by insulating future earnings from
personal injury claimants in bankruptcy proceedings resulted in considerable moral out-
rage and condemnation. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug.
27, 1982, at D4, col. 5.
92 This is the essence of the risk-benefit test for determining defectiveness. See, e.g.,
R. POSNER, supra note 75, § 6.1 (describing risk-benefit model for negligence). Courts in
a number ofjurisdictions employ a variety of other, less economically oriented, tests. See
Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293,
300-13 (1979) (discussing five tests for determining design defect).
93 G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 136-43, 241.
94 One contemporary example of the inability to allocate costs appropriately is the
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competitiveness, the difficulty of obtaining information, and indus-
try entry costs are some of the important variables that affect the
actual degree of risk spreading and the extent to which it furthers
more efficient resource allocation.95 The haphazard and imperfect
way that entities distribute accident costs cautions against taking
market deterrence too seriously in the contemporary tort
landscape.96
The crowning blow to the market deterrence theory is the suc-
cessor's inability to distribute costs to the appropriate consumers:
purchasers from the predecessor. A successor can only spread to its
own customers. Forcing the successor to pass both its and the pred-
ecessor's products liability costs to its own customers requires an act
of supererogation by the successor.9 7
c. Financial Incentives to Take Corrective Measures. A third facet of
the deterrence rationale focuses on remedial safety measures that
successors can undertake. This aspect of deterrence includes two
distinct strands. First, the successor, independent of its relationship
with the predecessor, has a duty to warn based on the knowledge
that the successor obtains when servicing and inspecting the defec-
tive product.9 Second, courts should impose liability on the succes-
sor to induce it to take any cost-justified remedial safety measures. 99
The first argument, employed primarily by courts that refuse to
accept liberal successor liability law, exemplifies the courts' search
for entities other than the manufacturer that have an opportunity to
prevent injuries.' 00 As such this is not at all a justification for suc-
prospect of asbestos insurers raising homeowners' insurance rates to provide funds to
meet asbestos claims. Wall St.J.,June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1982, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
95 The "theory of second best," as applied to this context, suggests that if other
distortions in the market prevent an optimal resource allocation, tying losses to the
products that cause them will not necessarily contribute to more efficient allocation. See
Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 Rxv. ECON. SrUD. 11 (1956).
96 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ.
499, 503-14, 520-27 (1961).
97 See Henderson, supra note 1, at 942-44; Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 878-79 (1983); Note, supra
note 33, at 375 n. 181. In the long run, when successor liability rules are clearly defined,
successors will insist on spreading back to the predecessor the cost of claims attributable
to the predecessor's operations. See infra text accompanying note 106.
98 See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441-43 (7th Cir. 1977).
99 See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 351, 431 A.2d 811, 821 (1981)
(court imposed successor liability in part because successor was only entity available to
avoid risks presented by predecessor's products still on market); Tift v. Forage King
Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 97, 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (1982) (Callow, J., dissenting) (dis-
agreeing with rationale that successor held liable because it "has the knowledge neces-
sary to improve the product and the imposition of liability acts as an incentive to ensure
the product's improvement").
100 See supra notes 8 & 55.
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cessor liability, but a limited attempt to find a viable substitute
defendant.101
The latter argument-designating an entity to bear the costs of
injuries caused by a defective product-can promote deterrence, es-
pecially when the designated entity has information and technologi-
cal expertise relating to the product. In this respect, successors are
in effect appointed to act as surrogates for the original manufactur-
ers, who, absent dissolution, would retain incentives for cost-justi-
fied retroactive safety measures because of their liability for
defective product injuries. 0 2
In spite of this argument's appeal, knowledge and expertise
alone are insufficient to justify transferring liability from the prede-
cessor to the successor.10 3 Beyond equity concerns, the designated
surrogate theory does not justify holding a successor liable when
retrospective safety measures are not cost justified. Logically,
courts should hold the successor liable only when retrospective
measures are cost justified and liability should not depend on
whether the product was defective when initially sold. The succes-
sor would then become the designated entity to minimize the sum of
accident costs and accident prevention, although the fairness of im-
posing that burden on it, given its nonparticipation in the creation
of the risk, is debatable. 10 4
In sum, creating financial incentives for entities to minimize ac-
cident costs is an instrumentally sound idea. These deterrence theo-
ries, however, do not justify imposing liability on successors.
8. The Successor As a Conduit
The analysis of each of the previous justifications for liberal suc-
cessor liability law deliberately omitted any reference to or reliance
on the conduit rationale. Any rationale that purports to justify im-
101 In any event, this theory would have little utility in protecting long-tail claimants;
only a fraction of successors would have sufficient knowledge of the dangers to justify
imposition of a duty on them. Moreover a warning, at least in the context of industrial
machinery, is unlikely to make any significant contribution to accident prevention. The
dangers of machinery are usually self-evident, and accident prevention is dependent on
additional safety devices, not warnings. See, e.g., Micallefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,
348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290
A.2d 281 (1972).
102 See TiME, Apr. 15, 1985, at 86 (A. H. Robins spent $5 million to warn women
using Dalkon Shields and to pay for their removal). Aside from their at-risk status as the
manufacturers of defective products, manufacturers have had their retroactive obliga-
tions expanded by courts where greater knowledge of risk or safety technology had been
obtained after manufacture. See Schwartz, supra note 80.
103 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1964) (imposing duty to take
remedial measures only on one whose initial act "created an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing physical harm to another").
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posing liability on the successor, whether as a primary or secondary
choice, is inherently inconsistent with the conduit theory. Unlike all
of the other rationales, the conduit theory expressly acknowledges
that the predecessor is liable for injuries caused by defects in its
products. The conduit theory imposes liability not on the successor
qua successor, but only as a vehicle to transfer the costs of future
products liability back to the predecessor. The successor acts as a
conduit by discounting the purchase price of the acquisition by the
amount of the predecessor's predicted future products liability. 10 5
The conduit theory also furthers the goals of compensation, de-
terrence, risk spreading, and moral retribution that form the foun-
dation of modem products liability law. Moreover, once liberal
successor liability laws are adopted and become known, successors
will inevitably insist on creating some mechanism to ensure that
they avoid the predecessor's future products liability. Potential suc-
cessors will either discount the purchase price to reflect the future
liability, demand that the predecessor acquire insurance or provide
some other mechanism to ensure that the predecessor bears the
costs of future claims, or, if no acceptable mechanism can be fash-
ioned, withdraw from the proposed acquisition.' 0 6
Having cut through much of the rhetoric used to justify liberal
successor liability law and with its policies and limitations more
clearly in focus, this article proceeds to evaluate the efficiency and
accuracy of the doctrine in protecting long-tail products liability
claimants.
105 Thus, one court that adopted an expanded continuation theory candidly ac-
knowledged that an indemnification agreement obtained by the successor from the par-
ent of the predecessor justified its holding:
If [the successor] is kept as a defendant in this case, in all probability it
will be [the parent] which will bear the risk of loss. [The parent] owned
[the predecessor] and caused its dissolution. [The parent] is the entity to
whom the risk of loss should be shifted under a public policy argument in
the context of this case.
Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541, 1546 (D.V.I. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 75 (3d
Cir. 1986); see also Schulman, supra note 54, at 139.
Perhaps a case in which the successor obtained the assets of an insolvent predeces-
sor and used them to continue making the same product line with the same employees,
management, and physical facilities would provide the ultimate test of the primacy of the
conduit function. Although I have not found any case squarely posing these facts, at
least two cases suggest that conduit is king. See R. J. Enstrom Corp. v. Interceptor
Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 282 (10th Cir. 1977); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d
258, 692 P.2d 787 (1984). But cf. Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., 220 Neb.
175, 368 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (summaryjudgment for successor reversed despite liquida-
tion of predecessor while in financial distress).
106 This may overstate the matter. In the absence of perfect information, the succes-
sor will attempt to protect itself, but it may nevertheless accept arrangements that do
not guarantee that the predecessor bears all future products liability costs. See infra
notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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III
THE SUPERIORITY OF A DISSOLUTION-RESTRICTING
STATUTE
Liberal successor liability law can provide a measure of protec-
tion for long-tail products liability claimants. In the long run, as the
boundaries of liberal successor liability law become more familiar,
the products liability costs likely to be imposed on the successor will
become a bargaining point in the acquisition process, ultimately
transferring the costs imposed on the successor to the predecessor,
estimation problems aside. Within the constraints of the common
law process, this may provide the only means to protect long-tail
products liability creditors.
A preferable reform, however, is a statute restricting the right
of corporations to dissolve and distribute their assets to sharehold-
ers.' 0 7 A dissolution-restricting statute ensures that the predeces-
sor's assets are available to future products liability claimants. The
statute also ensures that the predecessor bears the financial burden
of claims arising out of injuries caused by its defective products.
The statute can provide flexibility without diminishing the effectua-
tion of those goals by allowing the predecessor to dissolve and dis-
tribute its assets by arranging for another entity to assume the
predecessor's future liability.
This section compares the relative strengths of liberal successor
liability law and a dissolution-restricting statute and focuses on their
respective ability to protect long-tail products claimants in a manner
that is consistent with basic corporate and tort system objectives.
This analysis evaluates the extent to which each reform comprehen-
sively, efficiently, and fairly performs its protection goal.
The ensuing discussion of both liberal successor liability law
and a dissolution-restricting statute requires a caveat. No system
designed solely to protect the rights of creditors against the debtor
corporation can untangle the conflicting claims of an insolvent cor-
poration's creditors. Intracreditor claims, whether they arise in the
successor context or not, raise bankruptcy issues and are outside the
province of a solution to the successor liability question. 10 8
107 The term "liquidation" is sometimes used to include both the process of winding
up the corporation's business and the distribution of its assets to stockholders. Here I
use the narrower term "distribution," because engaging in other aspects of the liquida-
tion process, including ceasing business operation, should not impair claimants' rights.
108 See Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984) (addressing
bankruptcy solution to large tort liability); Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Torts: A Comment
on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559, 1578-80 (1984) [here-
inafter Roe, Successor Liability] (same); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort
Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123-28 (1983).
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A. Comprehensiveness and Discrimination
Initially, a dissolution-restricting statute starts with a significant
advantage: it directly addresses the problem raised when a
nonexistent manufacturer is called upon to answer the claims of per-
sons injured by its product. Although this statute as structured
might not provide complete protection for claimants,10 9 it would
reach far beyond liberal successor liability law, which does not pro-
tect claimants if product line or corporate continuity is lacking. 110
A dissolution-restricting statute also provides superior protec-
tion when a predecessor's products liability burden exceeds the
value of its goodwill."' Under any existing version of liberal suc-
cessor liability law, piecemeal sale of the predecessor's assets would
not impose successor liability on the purchasers of the assets, thus
leaving claimants without any remedy once the predecessor had dis-
solved. By contrast, a dissolution-restricting statute removes the in-
centive for piecemeal dismantling in this situation and incidentally
avoids the loss to society of the value of the predecessor as a going
concern. 112
109 See, e.g., infra note 164.
110 See, e.g., Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 328 S.E.2d 726 (1985)
(successor not liable because it did not continue product line in question); see also Schul-
man, supra note 54, at 143 (criticizing product line continuity theory).
The incentive of parties to an acquisition to exploit the inadequacies of liberal suc-
cessor liability law exacerbates its lack of comprehensiveness. If the parties succeed in
structuring an acquisition so as to avoid successor liability, they increase their collective
wealth to the extent that they avoid successor liability.
111 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
112 See Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances
and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 720-28 (1985).
It is difficult to assess the pervasiveness of this problem. Here in particular, reliance
on appellate court opinions as an empirical measure is misconceived. Some commenta-
tors have speculated that this piecemeal liquidation phenomenon is relatively rare be-
cause of the low value of a piecemeal liquidation. Juenger & Schulman, supra note 25, at
57; Roe, Successor Liability, supra note 108, at 1590 & n.78. Equally important in predict-
ing the incidence of piecemeal liquidation is the number of corporations that, although
solvent, have a high burden of future products liability claims. In the capital-intensive
industrial machine industry, which provides a great deal of grist for the successor liabil-
ity mill, a greater likelihood exists that the predecessor would find piecemeal liquidation
financially advantageous. See also Wall. St.J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (UNR Industries
considered liquidation before filing for chapter 11 reorganization); Wall St. J., June 3,
1976, at 1, col. 6 (small industrial press manufacturer liquidated piecemeal).
In addition, in the closely held company, much of its value may be made up of
human capital-the knowledge and experience the owners gain in operating the firm.
That value is not likely to be lost in a piecemeal liquidation; the owners can reap that
benefit by establishing another corporation after liquidation. See Roe, Corporate Strategic
Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 55-56 (1986) [hereinafter Roe, Strategic Reaction].
Whether that experience and knowledge constitute "capital" of the company upon
which its creditors have a legitimate claim upon dissolution raises an interesting ques-
tion that liberal successor liability law has not yet squarely confronted or resolved. Cf.
Timmerman v. American Trencher, Inc., 220 Neb. 175, 368 N.W.2d 502 (1985) (closely
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A dissolution-restricting statute also avoids the inevitable ten-
sion in liberal successor liability law between providing comprehen-
sive protection for future claimants and adhering to the conduit
function. Because the successor is only held liable when the prede-
cessor is unavailable, the predecessor's dissolution is a prerequisite
to successor liability." 3 But the successor's only practical opportu-
nity to demand reimbursement for the predecessor's future prod-
ucts liability occurs at the time of the acquisition. If successor
liability is limited to asset acquisitions in which the predecessor's
subsequent dissolution is contemplated or even foreseeable, long-
tail claimants are not comprehensively protected.' 14 If, on the other
hand, successor liability is imposed whenever the predecessor is ab-
sent, regardless of the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the acquisition, the conduit function is impaired because the succes-
sor is deprived of the opportunity to pass the costs back to the pred-
ecessor. 1 5 A dissolution-restricting statute avoids these problems
by keeping the predecessor's assets available for future products lia-
bility claimants if the successor does not assume liability at the time
of the acquisition.
Another problem is presented when, after the acquisition, un-
anticipated claims arise that exceed the predecessor's value. 16 Be-
cause the predecessor is the entity properly liable for injuries caused
by its defective products,1 7 the predecessor's capacity to pay should
mark the outside limit of claimants' recoveries from a successor.
Under liberal successor liability law, claimants may "piggyback"
onto the successor's wealth unless a ceiling is placed on the total
held predecessor in financial distress liquidated; principals of predecessor formed suc-
cessor, which was sued by long-tail products claimant).
113 More accurately, the practical unavailability of the predecessor's assets to the
claimant-because of a distribution to the predecessor's stockholders-should trigger
successor liability.
114 A similar conflict between comprehensiveness and conduit effectuation arises in
the myriad situations that do not conform to classic acquisitions of corporate assets. To
illustrate by way of example, a successor may continue a product line simply by acquir-
ing a trademark or trademark license, by renting assets necessary for production, see
Kadens, supra note 37, at 21-22; Note, Expanding Liability, supra note 25, at 1329, or by
purchasing a division of a corporation that later dissolves.
115 This conflict might be obviated by an agreement between the predecessor and
the successor either restricting the predecessor's ability to dissolve, or providing com-
pensation to the successor in the event of dissolution. The former solution is simply a
private agreement to adopt a dissolution-restricting scheme, which may not be entirely
effective. See Cowan v. Harris Corp., [May 1983-May 1984] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
9667 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 1982). The latter injects yet another layer of uncertainty into the
acquisition-bargaining process. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
116 Circumstances in which the predecessor's projected future claims exceed its
value give rise to insolvency problems. See supra text accompanying note 108. Moreover,
a successor who anticipates a products liability burden that exceeds the value of the
predecessor will not purchase it if those liabilities are transferred along with the assets.
117 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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recovery. 1 8 Unfortunately, as Professor Roe has pointed out, there
is no entirely satisfactory method for establishing what the ceiling
should be.' 19 Initially, a statutory restriction on dissolution appears
to avoid the piggyback problem by isolating the predecessor's assets
from those of the successor. However, when the successor agrees to
assume the predecessor's liability, the potential for piggybacking
still exists. Thus, while the statute does not always eliminate the
problem, it allows the successor to make a calculated decision based
on the perceived extent of the predecessor's liability and the risk of
unforeseen claims, and to structure the purchase so as to avoid
piggybacking.' 20
B. Efficiency
Common law regulation is notoriously imprecise, and liberal
successor liability law has done nothing to diminish that reputation.
While tort law remains unapologetic about its amorphousness, 12 '
corporate and commercial law have traditionally struggled to
achieve greater certainty and specificity for those they regulate. The
uncertainty created by liberal successor liability law's lack of a co-
herent theoretical framework and multiple indefinite standards
adopted retroactively is costly, inefficient, and no doubt disconcert-
ing to the corporate acquisitions community.
118 A successor might attempt to protect itself from piggybacking either by purchas-
ing the predecessor's stock rather than its assets or by forming a subsidiary to purchase
the predecessor's assets. The latter method, known as a triangular acquisition, is often
employed in an attempt to avoid piggybacking. However, neither alternative is useful if
the successor wishes to integrate the predecessor's operations into its own.
119 Roe, Successor Liability, supra note 108, at 1569-71.
The value the parties place on the predecessor's assets provides an obvious ceiling.
The price paid by the successor to the predecessor, which is readily determinable, is
already discounted by the anticipated future products liability burden. Absent a reliable
measure of that burden, one cannot calculate the predecessor's total value at the time of
sale. The incentive is thus created for the parties to minimize their valuation of the fu-
ture products liability burden in order to set a low ceiling for future products liability
claims. Id. at 1570 n.29.
A retrospective judicial determination of the predecessor's total value at the time of
sale provides a second source for a ceiling. As Professor Roe has explained, however,
courts are not particularly capable of making that sort of finding. Id. at 1570. Moreover,
to litigate such complex financial matters in each claimant's case against a successor that
asserted the ceiling had been reached would consume a colossal amount of resources
over a collateral matter.
120 Under the statute, assuming that parties correctly identify those instances in
which the risk of a high products liability burden (in relation to the predecessor's value)
exists, the predecessor's legitimate interest in making arrangements for immediate dis-
solution and distribution is diminished. This is precisely the situation in which a succes-
sor would likely be most reluctant to agree to assume the predecessor's obligations.
121 See Green, supra note 79, at 162.
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1. Identifying the Appropriate Defendant
Any rule adopted to protect long-tail products liability claim-
ants should strive to minimize the costs associated with identifying
the appropriate defendant. A dissolution-restricting statute identi-
fies clearly the predecessor as the entity liable to the claimant. Any
predecessor that had obtained insurance or assigned its liability to
another entity before dissolving could be required to record that
information with other corporate records maintained by the state.
Thus, identifying the appropriate defendant becomes no more diffi-
cult than determining the manufacturer of the product involved.
Liberal successor liability law, by contrast, virtually mandates
that the plaintiff use substantial resources to identify the appropri-
ate defendant. The expanded continuation theory requires an in-
quiry into factors such as whether the predecessor's assets, physical
location, employees, management, and operations are identical or
similar to the successor's, essentially guaranteeing that the parties
expend substantial efforts to flesh out the underlying facts; 122 more-
over, the uncertainty created by the indeterminate "totality of the
circumstances" standard 123 results in higher litigation costs.' 24
Although the product line continuation theory should provide
greater clarity and ease of proof, one must be careful not to under-
estimate the efforts required to obtain the relevant facts of a corpo-
rate acquisition from an uncooperative defendant.' 25
Because of the lack of a coherent theoretical framework, liberal
successor liability law also encourages joinder of superfluous de-
fendants and wasteful litigation over which of several entities should
assume liability.' 26 This squandering of resources often arises when
122 See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 348 n.3, 431 A.2d 811, 819 n.3
(1979); see also Comment, Restoration of Certainty, supra note 37, at 457 (proposing laundry
list of factors relevant to extended continuation analysis).
123 Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F. Supp. 349, 350 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
Although the court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d
873 (1976) gave conflicting signals as to whether the determination of continuity was
one of fact or law, other courts have interpreted Turner as leaving the determination to
the jury. See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1985);
Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 350. This exacerbates the uncertainty created by a continuation
standard by shrouding the outcome of each case with the jury's factual blanket.
124 Green, supra note 79, at 181 (discussing uncertainty and consequent increased
costs in settlement context).
125 See Parra v. Production Mach. Co., 611 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (court de-
nied cross-motions for summary judgment because of paucity of evidence presented as
to material facts; evidence which, one would expect, defendant had access to and would
have brought forth if favorable to it).
126 See, e.g., Roy v. Bolens Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Mass. 1986).
Recent reform efforts in products liability have attempted to reduce squandering of
resources in the litigation process by seeking to clarify which of the entities involved in
producing a product is liable. See, e.g., Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 105(c), 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,726 (1979); S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1983).
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there are multiple, sequential successors, 127 or when there are mul-
tiple, continuous successors, one of whom has purchased the prod-
uct line and one or more of whom have purchased the remainder of
the predecessor. 128 The incoherence of liberal successor liability
law makes definitive determinations as to which entity should as-
sume liability extremely difficult, causing courts to hold multiple
successors liable in some cases, and no successor liable in others. 129
The unavailability of the predecessor trigger and adherence to
the conduit function require further inquiry into the existence vel
non of the predecessor, its financial status and, where appropriate,
the reason for its nominal status. Not only is the predecessor's fi-
nancial insufficiency a prerequisite to the imposition of successor li-
ability, but to remain true to the conduit function, courts must limit
successor liability to those circumstances in which the predecessor's
financial insufficiency is caused by a distribution of assets to stock-
holders.130 To the extent that the predecessor's financial inability is
a result of insolvency incurred during continuing operations, the
problem is one for bankruptcy law, and liability should not be im-
posed on the successor.' 3 '
Although most courts have managed, albeit somewhat circui-
tously, to avoid imposing successor liability when the predecessor's
insolvency did not result from a distribution to stockholders, 132 nu-
merous decisions display indifference to the reason for the prede-
cessor's insolvency, either because of a lack of appreciation for the
analytics of successor theory or the difficulties of proof. 133
127 See, e.g., Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 NJ. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
128 See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980).
129 Perhaps the most egregious lapse of logic in this regard occurred in Tift v. For-
age King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982). In the same breath, the
court asserted both that the successor could be held liable because it was "the 'same'
business that produced the original product" and that the successor could assert an
indemnification claim against the predecessor. Id. at 79-80, 322 N.W.2d at 17.
130 As long as the predecessor is solvent (including its future products liability bur-
den) at the time of sale, the successor can discount its purchase price and protect itself
from ultimately bearing the costs of the predecessor's products claims. However, if the
future products liability burden exceeds the asset value of the predecessor, and if the
parties miscalculate, the successor will ultimately bear some portion of the predecessor's
liability. Logically, the asset value of the predecessor at the time of acquisition should
provide a cap on the liability imposed on a successor. See Roe, Successor Liability, supra
note 108, at 1569-71.
131 See supra text accompanying note 108.
132 See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (no
successor liability where because of bankruptcy reorganization predecessor could not
respond to plaintiffs' claims); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d
118 (N.D. 1984) (no liability for successor who purchased bulk of assets from predeces-
sor in receivership); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 103 Wash. 2d 258, 692 P.2d 787
(1984) (no successor liability where predecessor was in chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization).
133 E.g., Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding
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2. Minimizing Interference with the Sale of a Going Concern
Any scheme to protect long-tail products claimants should min-
imize disincentives to asset transfers. Because some owners can put
assets to more productive use than others, asset transfers are eco-
nomically desirable. A dissolution-restricting statute is preferable
to liberal successor liability law because the statute minimizes inter-
ference with, and the costs of, corporate asset acquisitions.
The conduit function of liberal successor liability law requires
that the parties estimate the value of the predecessor's future prod-
ucts liability. Valuing this liability can be extremely complex, if not
impossible. The parties must evaluate risks that are not fully under-
stood, predict the impact of any reforms in the underlying substan-
tive law, estimate the likelihood of successor liability, 134 and
actuarialize the effect of different successor liability rules across the
fifty states.' 3 5 Moreover, the buyer must often undertake the valua-
tion having to rely on the seller to provide critical information. 36
The difficulty and uncertainty in valuing the predecessor's po-
tential products liability inhibits corporate assets sales.' 3 7 These
problems also make the acquisition process more expensive, be-
cause the parties incur the costs of obtaining or developing the in-
formation needed to make the valuation.
By contrast, a dissolution-restricting statute would not require
that the parties determine the predecessor's future liability, or re-
quire that the successor assume the risk of an erroneous valuation.
When the predecessor and successor do decide to bargain for the
assumption of future claims to enable the predecessor to dissolve
successor liability of purchaser of manufacturing assets without addressing existence or
financial status of predecessor); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y.2d 239, 244,
451 N.E.2d 195, 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (1983) (no successor liability when prede-
cessor survived purchase as distinct entity; court noting only that predecessor "has few
assets").
134 See supra text accompanying notes 122-24. One practicing attorney noted:
"[G]iven the disparate definitions applied to 'de facto' merger in various jurisdictions,
combined with the multijurisdictional nature of many acquisitions, the obstacles to satis-
fying relevant judicial criteria may seem hopelessly blocked with undecipherably intri-
cate or even invisible barriers." Winthrop, supra note 42, at 206.
135 This process also requires the parties to consider conflict-of-law provisions and
their impact on successor liability. See, e.g., Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co., 356 N.W.2d
380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see generally Comment, Choice-of-Law in Minnesota Corporate
Successor Products Liability: Which Rule Is the "Better Rule"?, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 388-409
(1985).
136 See Roe, Successor Liability, supra note 108, at 1573-74 (The seller "will usually
have better information than [the buyer] about [the seller's] operations. And [the seller]
will have an incentive to overstate its value and understate any associated problems.").
137 See, e.g., Allied Drops Bid to Purchase Chemical Division of GAF Corp., [1983] Asbestos
Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 6995 (Aug. 12, 1983) [hereinafter Allied Drops Bid] (uncertainty
about successor liability for GAF's asbestos liability undermined proposed purchase of
product line from GAF; transaction ultimately cancelled).
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and liquidate, the certainty provided by the statute should reduce
the efforts required to make a valuation.1 38
In addition to reducing the efforts associated with valuation, a
dissolution-restricting statute clearly releases the successor from
any of the predecessor's obligations that the successor does not ex-
pressly agree to assume,' 39 thus assuring potential purchasers that
they are not at risk for subsequent claims arising from the predeces-
sor's products. 140 This certainty makes a dissolution-restricting stat-
ute preferable to liberal successor liability law whenever the
predecessor's continued existence is subject to doubt.
A dissolution-restricting statute may have a dampening effect
on asset acquisitions' 4 ' when the predecessor cannot find an entity
to assume its future liability, thereby preventing the predecessor's
shareholders from receiving the proceeds of the sale. 142 But these
difficulties should not impede an acquisition when another party
138 Complete uniformity would require the enactment of a dissolution-restricting
statute in every state or inclusion of a similar provision in a federal products liability
statute. A number of federal products liability bills have received serious congressional
attention in recent years, e.g., 14 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 448 (June 27, 1986);
13 id. at 902 (Nov. 29, 1985), and the current administration has also supported the
concept of a federal products liability statute, in part because of the "uniformity" it
could provide in regulating manufacturers who are engaged in interstate distribution of
their products. 14 id. at 350 (May 23, 1986); id. at 379-80 (June 6, 1986). Politics being
what it is, one should not be surprised that no consideration of a provision to protect
long-tail products claimants has surfaced in the proposals for a federal statute, to my
knowledge.
In any case, if the jurisdiction in which the predecessor was incorporated had
adopted a dissolution-restricting statute, the parties to the acquisition would recognize
that there was no way to structure the sale to avoid future liability. This knowledge
would force the parties to confront the future liability issue and make adequate provi-
sion for future claims. With that provision in place, there would be no need for liberal
successor liability law, with its attendant uncertainty, to be invoked, even for a plaintiff
who could take advantage of the tort laws of a state other than the one in which the
predecessor was incorporated.
Candor compels me to confess that one wholly undesirable incentive created by
enacting dissolution-restricting statutes in some, but not all, states, would be for an in-
cipient corporation to avoid incorporating in those states with dissolution-restricting
statutes. Of course, similar incentives already exist given the variations in state corpo-
rate law provisions.
139 See infra Proposed Statute § 1(f).
140 It was precisely this concern that thwarted the proposed sale of GAF Corpora-
tion's chemical group to Allied Corporation. Allied Drops Bid, supra note 137.
141 A dissolution-restricting statute also eliminates incentives to engage in asset ac-
quisitions for the purpose of avoiding some portion of future products claims. Eliminat-
ing this incentive, which amounts to an involuntary subsidy of asset acquisitions by
future products claimants, should reduce the incidence of economically unjustified asset
acquisitions.
142 Shareholders of a publicly traded company can always sell their stock to extricate
their investment. This is not true for shareholders who have no market for their shares.
An exception to a dissolution-restricting statute might be provided for some very closely
held corporations, subject to the shareholders assuming liability in their individual ca-
pacities. See infra note 164.
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places a higher value on the assets than the current owner-the par-
adigm of the efficient market transaction.
IV
A PROPOSAL FOR A DISSOLUTION-RESTRICTING STATUTE
The inadequacy of state dissolution statutes to protect long-tail
claimants has been well documented.1 43 Indeed, that inadequacy
has stimulated the development of liberal successor liability law.
Until its revision in 1984, the Model Business Corporation Act made
no provision for claims arising after dissolution and imposed a two-
year limitation on predissolution claims. 144 Some authorities sug-
gest that statutory dissolution provisions do not preempt the com-
mon law trust fund theory, which permits creditors to recover from
shareholders to the extent that shareholders receive distributions in
dissolution from a corporation. 145 The trust fund theory, however,
provides little practical relief to the long-tail products claimant. In
all but the most closely held corporations, the difficulties and ex-
pense of identifying shareholders and prosecuting multiple suits
against them present insuperable barriers to utilizing this remedy.
In sum, neither existing state dissolution statutes nor the trust fund
theory provides a realistic remedy for most long-tail products
claimants.
The 1984 revision of the Model Act for the first time recognized
the problems faced by the long-tail claimant. 146 However, the draft-
ers' solution-a five-year limitation on claims against dissolved cor-
porations and their shareholders147-does little to alleviate the
situation. In the vast majority of successor liability cases suits are
not filed within five years of the predecessor's sale of assets.148 The
limitation on a shareholder's liability to the lesser of her pro rata
143 See Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 865 (1971);Juenger & Schulman, supra note 25, at 40-43; Roe, Successor
Liability, supra note 108, at 1564 nn.14 & 15; Wallach, supra note 25, at 323-35.
144 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr. § 105 (1979).
145 Friedlander & Lannie, Post-Dissolution Liabilities of Shareholders and Directors for
Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1363 (1978); Henn & Alexander,
supra note 143, at 894-96.
146 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 14.07 official comment (1984).
147 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 14.07 (1984). The Model Act's attempt to accom-
modate long-tail products claimants raises several questions. For example, § 14.07(c)
bars postdissolution claims not asserted within five years after the publication of notice
of dissolution. However, the Model Act does not speak to postdissolution claims if the
dissolved corporation does not publish notice in accordance with the Model Act.
148 I base this assertion on the reported cases that I have come across, as well as the
types of products claims that lead to successor liability cases. See supra note 11 and text
accompanying notes 1-2. Because most courts' successor liability opinions do not pro-
vide the date of the predecessor's dissolution, but do identify the date of the asset sale, I
have used the latter as an approximation for the former.
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share of the claim or the amount of assets distributed to her in con-
nection with the dissolution 149 further reduces the utility of the ex-
panded abatement period.15 0 Although the expanded period in
which to bring suit may provide a practical remedy for a few succes-
sor liability claims, it does not resolve the problems of most long-tail
claimants-problems that lead to the development of liberal succes-
sor liability law.
The proposed statute confronts the long-tail products claimant
problem more directly and effectively than do the Model Act and
existing state dissolution statutes. The proposed statute is also flex-
ible enough to accommodate the varying circumstances surround-
ing sales of corporate assets by dissolving corporations. 151
§ 1 LIMITATIONS ON DISSOLUTION AND DISTRIBUTIONS
IN CONNECTION WITH DISSOLUTION
(a) Definitions
(1) "Product" means any object, substance,
mixture, raw material, or mineral that:
(A) has intrinsic economic value;
(B) is capable of delivery itself or as a com-
ponent part or ingredient; and
(C) is produced for distribution in trade or
commerce.
(2) "Manufacturing" means engaging in busi-
ness to produce, make, create, construct, assemble, or
fabricate any product or component part of a prod-
uct. The term also includes the remanufacturing of
any existing product or component part of an existing
product.
(3) "Postdissolution Products Liability Claim"
means any claim for damages arising out of the manu-
facture, sale, or lease of a product by a corporation
that is based at least in part on events occurring after
the effective date of the corporation's dissolution.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, no corpora-
tion that has engaged in manufacturing products that it sells or
leases may dissolve or distribute its assets to its shareholders in con-
nection with its dissolution until the corporation has made adequate
149 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr § 14.07(d)(2) (1984).
150 The utility decreases even more because the stockholder's liability for all claims
is limited to the amount of assets distributed to her. Id.
151 As drafted, the statute can easily be incorporated into the Model Business Cor-
poration Act or a similar statute. It provides cross-references to a number of existing
provisions in the Model Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The Pro-
posed Statute would preempt portions of §§ 14.06 and 14.07 of the Model Act.
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provision for postdissolution products liability claims. A distribu-
tion made in the ordinary course of business does not violate this
section if it complies with the requirements of section 6.40(c) of the
Model Business Corporation Act' 52 and sections 4-7 of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act.' 5 3
(1) Provision for postdissolution products liability
claims may be made by:
(A) obtaining liability insurance for postdissolu-
tion products liability claims;
(B) transferring, as part of the sale of the corpora-
tion's assets, liability for future products liability claims to
the purchaser of the corporation's assets; or
(C) any other method that provides protection for
those asserting postdissolution products liability claims
against the corporation equivalent to the protection that
would have existed if the corporation had continued to
carry on its business and not undergone dissolution.
(2) Provision for postdissolution products liability
claims shall be adequate if the amount of insurance cover-
152 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1984) provides:
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect:
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they be-
come due in the usual course of business; or
(2) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its
total liabilities plus (unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise)
the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved
at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dis-
solution of shareholders whose preferential rights are superior to those
receiving the distribution.
153 UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985) provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be
thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual in-
tent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504 (1985) provides:
Every conveyance made without fair consideration when the person
making it is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for
which the property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an un-
reasonably small capital, is fraudulent as to creditors and as to other per-
sons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or
transaction without regard to his actual intent.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACr § 6, 7A U.L.A. 507 (1985) provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair
consideration when the person making the conveyance or entering into
the obligation intends or believes that he will incur debts beyond his abil-
ity to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985) provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual in-
tent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or
defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both pres-
ent and future creditors.
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age or other assets available to satisfy postdissolution
products liability claims is not less than:
(A) the corporation's net current value at the time
of dissolution; 15 4 plus
(B) the value of any prior distributions made to
shareholders in contemplation of dissolution.
(c) When a corporation makes provision for postdissolution
products liability claims, the articles of dissolution shall include:
(1) the name and address of any entity that, by insur-
ance or otherwise, has agreed to assume any obligations
arising out of the corporation's postdissolution products li-
ability claims; and
(2) a description of the assuming entity's obligations.
(d) A corporation may bring a proceeding in the [name of
appropriate court] to seek modification of its obligation to make ad-
equate provision for postdissolution products liability claims.
(1) Upon the filing of a petition for modification, the
court shall appoint a guardian to represent the interests of
all potential postdissolution products liability claimants.
(2) After conducting a hearing, the court may enter
an order modifying the corporation's obligation to make
adequate provision for postdissolution products liability
claims if it finds that:
(A) despite diligent efforts by the corporation to
make adequate provision for postdissolution products lia-
bility claimants, it cannot reasonably do so;
(B) the shareholders of the corporation will suffer
manifest injustice unless modification of the obligation of
adequate provision is permitted; and
(C) an alternative plan to protect postdissolution
products liability claimants strikes a reasonable balance be-
tween the interests of the postdissolution products liability
claimants and the stockholders' interest in avoiding the
manifest unfairness identified in section 1(d)(2)(B).
(3) If the court enters an order modifying the corpo-
ration's obligation to make adequate provision for postdis-
solution products liability claims, it shall specify in the
order any conditions that the corporation or its sharehold-
ers must satisfy in order to protect postdissolution prod-
ucts liability claimants.
154 These assets would include the value of any agreement by another entity to as-
sume liability for any postdissolution products liability claims against the dissolving
corporation.
[Vol. 72:17
1986] SUCCESSOR LIABILITY A STATUTORY SOLUTION 53
(4) The court shall award compensation and ex-
penses to the guardian out of the assets of the corporation,
or out of the proceeds from the sale of the corporation's
assets. Compensation and expenses may be paid from time
to time during the proceeding or at its conclusion, at the
discretion of the court.
(e) Officers and Directors
(1) Any director who:
(A) votes for, assents to, or resigns her position in
contemplation of a distribution or dissolution that is not in
compliance with this section; and
(B) in so doing fails to comply with the applicable
standards of conduct contained in section 8.30 of the
Model Business Corporation Act' 55
shall be personally liable to any postdissolution
products liability claimant to the same extent that the cor-
poration would have been liable had it not dissolved.
(2) Any officer who:
(A) recommends, acts to further, or resigns her
position in contemplation of a distribution or dissolution
that is not in compliance with this section; and
(B) in so doing fails to comply with the applicable
standard of conduct contained in section 8.42 of the Model
155 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984) provides:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his
duties as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on infor-
mation, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements
and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom
the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the
matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to mat-
ters the director reasonably believes are within the person's profes-
sional or expert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a
member if the director reasonably believes the committee merits
confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge con-
cerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted
by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for'any action taken as a director, or any
failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in com-
pliance with this section.
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Business Corporation Act' 56
shall be personally liable to any postdissolution
products liability claimant to the same extent that the cor-
poration would have been liable had it not dissolved.
(3) A director or officer sued for an unlawful distri-
bution or dissolution under this Act may assert a claim for
contribution against:
(A) any other director or officer liable under sec-
tion l(e)(1) or l(e)(2); and
(B) each shareholder who received proceeds from
the distribution.
(4) The contribution share of
(A) each officer or director shall be a pro rata
share of the claim less the amount recovered from share-
holders pursuant to section 1(e)(3)(B).
(B) each shareholder shall be the shareholder's
ratable share of the claim. The maximum liability of any
shareholder for contribution claims shall be the amount re-
ceived from distributions made in violation of this section.
(5) A director's or officer's liability pursuant to sec-
tion 1(e)(1) or l(e)(2) shall not exceed the amount that
would have been available from the corporation to satisfy
the claimants' claims if this section had not been violated.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in this Act or other statutory
provisions, the acquisition of assets from a corporation does not
subject the acquiring corporation to liability for claims relating to
156 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.42 (1984) provides:
(a) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties
under that authority:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties an officer is entitled to rely on infor-
mation, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements
and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom
the officer reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the mat-
ters presented; or
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to mat-
ters the officer reasonably believes are within the person's professional
or expert competence.
(c) An officer is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge con-
cerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted
by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) An officer is not liable for any action taken as an officer, or any
failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in com-
pliance with this section.
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products manufactured or sold by the selling corporation prior to
the acquisition. Notwithstanding the foregoing provision of this
subsection, the acquiring corporation may expressly assume any lia-
bilities of the selling corporation.
The statute is narrowly tailored to affect only manufacturers
and component part manufacturers, the parties in the distribution
chain who are ultimately responsible for the defective product.
Although others in the distribution chain may be liable to the in-
jured claimant, the ultimate liability remains with manufacturers and
component part manufacturers. Limiting the statute to those pri-
mary products liability defendants avoids the undesirable effect of
casting too wide a net and placing unnecessary restrictions on
dissolution.
By clearly stating that the liability belongs to the predecessor
and that the predecessor must make adequate provision for that lia-
bility before dissolution and distribution, the statute cuts to the
heart of the successor liability issue. The statute unequivocally im-
poses liability on the predecessor unless the successor expressly
agrees to assume the predecessor's liability. Of course, the statute
permits the predecessor to use an alternative means to satisfy its
obligations provided that the resources available to satisfy future
claims are equivalent to the resources that were available prior to its
dissolution.
No doubt, in many asset sales, the successor will be the pre-
ferred entity to assume the predecessor's liabilities as a term of the
acquisition. 57 Insurance coverage, particularly in situations in
which the predecessor's products liability burden is low, may pres-
ent an attractive alternative. 158 The predecessor may even choose
to continue to exist,' 59 especially if a market for its shares exists,
157 Insurance coverage of the successor for liability for the predecessor's products
has become relatively common. Telephone interview with George Tsui, Vice-President,
St. Paul. Ins. Co., St. Paul, Minn. (Feb. 21, 1985). Many lenders require successor liabil-
ity insurance as a condition for providing the financing for asset acquisitions. Tele-
phone interview with John Gross, Marsh & McLennan, Inc., New York City (Feb. 2 1,
1985).
158 Long-tail products liability insurance is generally available. See supra note 157. A
number of factors bear on how attractive this option will be for any particular corpora-
tion. The useful product life, previous loss exposure, and product risk will affect the
terms of any insurance policy, including the period of coverage. The transaction costs
associated with the underwriting process may make this option economically infeasible
for small corporations. Telephone interview with John Gross, Marsh & McLennan, Inc.,
New York City (Feb. 21, 1985); telephone interview with George Tsui, Vice-President,
St. Paul Ins. Co., St. Paul, Minn. (Feb. 21, 1985).
159 Continued existence, however, might foreclose the predecessor from taking ad-
vantage of I.R.C. § 337 (1982), which permits a liquidating corporation to avoid corpo-
rate tax liability on the sale of its assets if, within one year after adopting a liquidation
plan, the corporation completes the liquidation and distribution of its assets to stock-
56 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:17
enabling its stockholders to withdraw their investment by simply
trading their shares.' 60 Regardless of the alternative chosen, the
statute ensures that future products claimants can assert claims
against a pool of resources comparable to the value of the predeces-
sor's predissolution assets.
holders. See 13 B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CORPORATE AcquIsrrIONS
AND MERGERS § 5.04 (1986). Section 337 does, however, contain a provision permitting
the corporation to retain assets beyond the 12-month period to pay its contingent liabili-
ties. I.R.C. § 337(a) (1982); see 1 N. GOFF, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE
LIQUIDATIONS § 6.53 (1985).
160 If the proposed statute is to be effective in protecting long-tail products claim-
ants, there must be a mechanism regulating distributions, i.e., dividends and stock re-
purchases, to stockholders. Otherwise, the predecessor could be liquidated through
such distributions, with later products claimants being squeezed out. The statute, in
§ 1 (b), prohibits distributions that violate either MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40
(1984) or UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-7, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 507, 509
(1985). These provisions provide some measure of protection to long-tail claimants.
The provisions from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act are included for four
reasons. First, the scarcity of case law raises some doubt as to whether the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act provides protection to contingent claimants against current distri-
butions to shareholders. See Kummert, State Statutory Restrictions on Financial Distributions
by Corporations to Shareholders (pt. 1), 55 WASH. L. REV. 359, 394 & n.157 (1980); Murphy,
Equity Insolvency and the New Model Business Corporation Act, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 870
(1981).
Second, fraudulent conveyance law appears to provide greater and more flexible, if
not ironclad, protection to long-tail products liability claimants against distributions to
shareholders that would impair the predecessor's ability to satisfy its obligations to
those claimants. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 505, 554-59 (1977).
Third, explicitly including the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act requirements
negates any implication from some extant authority that state corporate law provisions
preempt fraudulent conveyance doctrine. See 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES § 604, at 1043-44 (rev. ed. 1940); R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, BANK-
RUPTCY 412-14 (1985); see also Clark, supra, at 558 n.154; Roe, Strategic Reaction, supra
note 112, at 21 n.53.
Finally, by incorporating the creditor protective provisions of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act into the proposed statute, the remedial provisions of the statute-
personal liability of directors and officers who assent to any improper distribution-
would be available to long-tail claimants, in contrast to the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act's remedies, which, at least in a widely held company, may not prove effective.
To the extent that wily corporate management can evade the protection provided
by corporate and fraudulent conveyance law and other, less formal constraints, the fault
lies not with the proposed statute, but more generally with inadequate protection for
creditors who do not have the opportunity to bargain for, and the leverage to obtain,
more rigorous limitations on corporate distributions. See Clark, supra, at 557-60; Easter-
brook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). See
generally Roe, Strategic Reaction, supra note 112.
A further concern in the investment corporation context is the type of risk that the
corporation might undertake in its investment decisions. If the corporation has distrib-
uted all of its equity to stockholders, as § 6.40 of the Model Act permits, then the stock-
holders cannot lose with regard to the corporation's investments: the shareholders
receive the benefits of a successful investment, but future products claimants suffer the
loss if the investments turn sour. See Roe, Successor Liability, supra note 108, at 1588-89 &
1589 n.75. Treating the directors and officers as fiduciaries for future claimants might
alleviate these concerns.
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The statute's enforcement mechanism imposes personal liabil-
ity on any director who approves, and any officer who furthers, a
distribution to stockholders in violation of the statute.1 61 Officers
and directors may obtain contribution from stockholders who re-
ceive distributions but directors and officers-not long-tail claim-
ants-bear the onerous burden of asserting a claim against a
potentially large and geographically diverse group of stockholders.
To eliminate incentives to leave an illegal dissolution to a few judg-
ment proof directors and officers, the statute also imposes liability
on directors and officers who resign in contemplation of a dissolu-
tion or distribution that violates the statute.162
The statute also provides an exception to the adequate provi-
sion requirement. 163 This exception allows for some flexibility, but
the statute adopts a strict standard for releasing the predecessor
from its obligations. 164 The provision requiring appointment of a
guardian for future claimants ensures an adversarial process and is
derived from the apparently successful employment of a guardian
161 This enforcement mechanism is not unfamiliar. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.33 (1984) (director liability for unlawful distributions); cf I.R.C. § 3505(b) (1982)
(personal liability of third parties supplying funds to employers when third parties have
actual notice or knowledge that employer will not satisfy its tax liability); U.P.C. § 3-
807(b) (1982) (personal liability of personal representative to creditors of estate whose
claim is compromised by premature payments to other creditors). See generally Kraak-
man, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857 (1984);
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 53 (1986).
Section 8.30 of the Model Business Corporation Act permits directors to authorize
distributions based on financial statements prepared by corporate employees and public
accountants. If a director's reliance is in good faith, she is exempted from liability.
This raises the concern that a director might approve an illegal distribution to
stockholders, yet be insulated from personal liability because she was unaware of poten-
tial future products liability claims. This scenario is unlikely, however. Generally ac-
cepted accounting principles require that a corporation charge a loss contingency
against current income when available information indicates the likelihood that the cor-
poration will incur the loss and the corporation can estimate the amount of the loss.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES (1975). Even if these conditions are not
satisfied, disclosure of the nature of the contingency and an estimate of the possible loss
or range of loss, if the corporation can make such an estimate, are required if there is a
reasonable possibility of loss. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS 8303 (1986). The accounting standards recognize future products liability
claims as loss contingencies. Id. at 8309-10.
162 See supra Proposed Statute § l(e)(1)(A), (e)(2)(A).
163 See supra Proposed Statute § 1 (d).
164 See supra Proposed Statute § I(d)(2). The best candidate for the exception is a
very closely held corporation in which most or all of the principals' assets are invested.
Indeed, a blanket exception for all very closely held corporations, coupled with share-
holder liability for any distributions, has some appeal. Ultimately, however, the inability
to control lifetime transfers of wealth and the short time period provided for asserting
claims against estates or distributees, U.P.C. §§ 3-803, 3-1006 (1982), caution against
this exception.
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for future claimants in the Manville bankruptcy proceedings. 165
No dissolution-restricting statute will obviate all successor lia-
bility problems. A dissolution-restricting statute acts prospectively;
product manufacturers that have already dissolved and distributed
their assets cannot be shoehorned into such a statute. Further, the
proposed statute may not be comprehensive enough to encompass
all primary products liability defendants. 166 The statute does not
even purport to address the successor question in areas other than
products liability. 167 Despite these limitations, the proposed statute
directly confronts the successor liability problem and provides, with
some degree of certainty, an answer that requires the predecessor to
recognize that postdissolution claims are its responsibility and en-
sures that it makes adequate provision for those claims.
Corporations with low potential liability should have no diffi-
culty convincing the successor or an insurer to assume responsibility
for future liability. Inevitably, some corporations with high poten-
tial liabilities will be unable either to make adequate alternative pro-
visions for their obligations or to demonstrate manifest injustice.
Stockholders of these corporations will not be able to withdraw their
investment if there is no market for their shares. Initially, one may
sympathize with the stockholders' predicament, but as between
them and long-tail creditors, the creditors' right to protection of
their claims should trump the shareholders' desire to withdraw their
investment from an entity with outstanding obligations. Moreover,
the stagnant predecessor phenomenon will likely be limited to cor-
porations with high products liability burdens, and the stockholders'
residual rights in these instances should be relatively small.
CONCLUSION
The resolution of the successor liability issue initially requires
recognition that products liability claimants are creditors of the
165 See 13 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 946 (Dec. 20, 1985).
166 The statute does not reach noncorporate manufacturers that operate as sole pro-
prietorships or partnerships, for example. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145,
1151 (1st Cir. 1974) (sole proprietorship manufactured product).
167 The successor liability issue has arisen in a number of other areas. See Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (obligation of
successor to arbitrate pursuant to collective bargaining agreement entered into by pred-
ecessor); Bates v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 744 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1984) (successor obli-
gated by consent decree entered in employment discrimination case); Goldstein v.
Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (liability of successor brokerage firm for
churning committed by predecessor); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Borden Co., 363 F.
Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (successor liability for patent infringement); Department of
Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Law Div. 1980)
(successor liability for discharge of hazardous substances). I suspect that the incongru-
ence of the problems presented in these areas makes a universal solution neither feasi-
ble nor desirable.
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predecessor corporation who have been precluded from submitting
their claims because of state dissolution and liquidation statutes that
never contemplated long-tail creditors. The law should not allow
corporations to cease operations in a manner that frustrates claims
of legitimate creditors. Most corporate creditors are protected
either by statutes or contractual provisions bargained for during the
existence of the corporate debtor. Long-tail products liability claim-
ants are not afforded statutory protection and are uniquely unable
to bargain with the predecessor. Predictably, a number of courts
have responded within the common law framework by fashioning
liberal successor liability law.
Careful analysis of the rationales provided by courts fashioning
liberal successor liability law reveals much jurisprudential rhetoric.
Given the luxury of time, reflection, and others' inquiry, it is easy to
criticize the courts' explanations for the development of liberal suc-
cessor liability law. In fairness, much of the tortured reasoning re-
sults from systemic constraints on the common law process; the
courts can only impose successor liability in a post hoc fashion,
which in the short run saddles successors with unanticipated liability
that they had no realistic opportunity to pass on to the predecessor
during the acquisition process. But it is time to consolidate our
learning and get on with the game. In the long run, liberal succes-
sor liability law inevitably will channel the costs of products claims
back to the predecessor.
An alternative method to ensure that the predecessor bears its
products liability burden is to enact a statute limiting the ability of
corporations to place their assets beyond the reach of long-tail
products claimants. Although such a statute would provide only a
prospective solution, it would provide protection for long-tail claim-
ants and give corporations involved in an acquisition the incentive
to allocate successor liability in the most efficient fashion. A statute
should remove uncertainty, enhance the alienability of ongoing
manufacturing businesses, and, at the same time, preserve a viable
remedy for the injured claimant.
Realistically, the proposed statute would confront significant
political hurdles. The lobby for long-tail products liability claimants
is exceedingly weak. In the absence of a statute, successors may be
able to escape liability to the extent that they can persuade courts
not to jump on the liberal successor liability bandwagon. Moreover,
the medicine may be bitter for some: the inability of some corpora-
tions to make adequate provision for postdissolution claims may im-
pinge on the stockholders' ability to withdraw or transfer their
investment. Finally, a state adopting a dissolution-restricting statute
will place a burden on corporations incorporated within that state
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that will inure to the benefit of long-tail claimants in other states to
which the corporations' products are shipped. 68 All of these fac-
tors are likely to generate substantial resistance to legislative
reform.
Nevertheless, a dissolution-restricting statute provides a mea-
sure of certainty that should appeal to corporations engaging in cor-
porate acquisitions. States have already enacted statutory
provisions that allocate liabilities in the merger and consolidation
context. Even if a statutory solution founders in unfriendly political
waters, this article's analysis of the rationales behind liberal succes-
sor liability law should provide some guidance to courts that will,
absent legislative action, inevitably face the claims of long-tail prod-
ucts liability claimants.
168 State legislation that favors a wider class of beneficiaries at the expense of citi-
zens because of choice-of-law provisions is not unknown. Most products liability reform
statutes make recovering from products liability defendants, many of whom are located
outside the state, more difficult for the state's citizens. See Twerski, National Product Lia-
bility Legislation: In Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 412-14,
412 n.7 & 414 n.9 (1982). The analogy between these state reform statutes and the
dissolution-restricting statute is not perfect: the entities benefitted by the state reform
efforts were manufacturing entities; those are the same parties who would suffer if a
dissolution-restricting statute were enacted.
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